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ABSTRACT
During the course of the Second World War, the United States and the United 
Kingdom established a close working relationship on a number of official and unofficial 
levels. Politicians and academics in both countries have described this closeness as a 
“special relationship”. The purpose of this study is to determine whether or not this 
closeness survived the war and whether the Anglo-American relationship was truly 
special.
To ascertain the answer to these questions two facets of the Anglo-American 
relationship were examined. The first investigates the Anglo-American nuclear 
relationship from 1939 to 1946. The second investigates the Anglo-American economic 
relationship from 1939 to 1946.
In the sphere of nuclear relations, both the United States and the United Kingdom 
contributed in scientifically significant ways to the construction of the first atomic bomb. 
Both countries were partners in the Manhattan Project. The United Kingdom was the 
first to do significant scientific research on the atomic bomb and was an extremely 
important supplier of fissionable matter. The United States contributed the bulk of 
material and technological work to the project.
In the sphere of economic relations the United States and the United Kingdom 
began collaboration even before the American entry into the Second World War. A 
system of “Lend-Lease” flooded the United Kingdom with money and materials. Later 
both sides agreed to a sweeping new vision of post-war economic order at the Bretton 
Woods Conference.
It is suggested by this study that the Anglo-American wartime closeness was an 
illusion. While high-level wartime agreements and assurances gave the impression that 
postwar collaboration was very likely, in the aftermath of the war the United States and 
the United Kingdom lost the very unity of interests that made wartime collaboration 
possible.
Primary and secondary evidence suggests that the Anglo-American relationship 
was not a “special” one, but a contentious relationship in which the interests of each side 
contradicted the other.
vi
ATOMS, POUNDS AND POOR RELATIONS 
THE ILLUSION OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
1941-1946
Britain has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. - Lord Palmerston1 
Would a special relationship between the United States and the British Commonwealth be inconsistent with
our overriding loyalties to a world organization?
- Winston Churchill
A short time after Pearl Harbor, Winston Churchill traveled to the United States, 
and stayed at the White House. Franklin Roosevelt, seeking to consult with Churchill, 
was wheeled into his guest’s bedroom. At that moment, Churchill emerged from his 
bathroom, wet and completely naked. Obviously embarrassed, Roosevelt prepared to 
leave. Churchill, however, waved him back, and declared “The Prime Minister of Great 
Britain has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States.”2
There is some question as to whether or not this actually occurred. Nonetheless 
the story illustrated the profound change in the historical relationship between the United 
States and Great Britain in the 1940’s. Previously, this relationship had been marked by 
war, hostile diplomacy and even more hostile public opinion. For most of the nineteenth 
century, Anglophobia was rampant in the United States. British expansion, both
1 Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class And Nostalgia, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990) p. 102.
2 Ibid.. p .l.
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commercial and territorial, was thought to be the greatest threat to American security, and 
the legacy of two wars did nothing to engender American trust. On the other hand,
British leaders such as George Canning and Lord Palmerston opposed what they saw as 
the greedy expansion of an unstable, moralizing and often hypocritical United States.
There was reconciliation in the late nineteenth century, but scholarly debate 
ensued over how early and how heartfelt that reconciliation was. Historian Bradford 
Perkins in The Great Rapprochement argued that reconciliation between the United 
States and Great Britain was both earnest and widespread by the early twentieth century. 
Edward Crapol in “From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American 
Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” from Confrontation and Cooperation: 
Germany and the United States in the Era o f World War /, argued the opposite. Crapol
maintained that this reconciliation was neither earnest nor widespread, but instead was
, . . .quite fragile. This revisionist view of the Anglo-American partnership saw the alliance
of the First and Second World Wars as being built on a foundation of sand, not stone.
The Anglo-American relationship in the twentieth century has been the basis of 
much scrutiny. The decline of the British Empire and the corresponding rise of the 
United States in terms of military and economic power has provided scholars with an 
interesting contrast.
The leap between a hostile relationship in which Neville Chamberlain consistently 
turned down an American role in negotiating with Germany, to one in which the Prime
3 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England And The United States, 1865-1914, (New York: 
Atheneum, 1968); Edward Crapol, in “From Anglophobia to Fragile Rapprochement: Anglo-American
Minister could declare that he had nothing to hide from the President occurred 
astonishingly fast.4 Was this new partnership in the twentieth century based on firm 
footing, or merely a marriage of convenience?
Churchill coined the term “special relationship” in his famous Fulton, Missouri, 
address. A quick perusal of historical literature pertaining to Anglo-American relations 
since that time would find innumerable references to this term.5 The intrinsic problem 
with the term “special relationship,” however, is that it is a slippery term. A large reason 
is its inherent ambiguity: special in relation to what? In the 1940’s, this ambiguity did not 
stop the diplomats and the academics from describing the relationship as such. Perhaps 
more disconcerting was the non-exclusivity of the term. Historian David Reynolds noted 
that academics have used then the term “special relationship” to describe the United 
States’ relations with several countries including Israel, Brazil, West Germany and pre­
communist China.6
The wartime partnership between the United States and Britain involved troops 
fighting together, scientists researching together, and leaders planning together. A cogent
Relations in the Early Twentieth Century,” Confrontation And Cooperation: Germany And The United 
States in the Era o f  World War I, Ed. Hans-Juergen Schroder (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1993)
4 Patrick J. Hearden, Roosevelt Confronts Hitler, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1987), p.99.
5 Peter Jones, America And The British Labour Party : The Special Relationship At Work , (New York: 
I.B. Tauris, 1997); John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance : The Anglo-American Special 
Relationship, 1940-57 (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co, 1995); C.J. Bartlett, 'The special relationship' : 
A Political History O f Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (New York: Longman, 1992); Wm. Roger 
Louis and Hedley Bull ed., The Special relationship : Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986) etc.
6 Ibid, p.4; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); 
John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., Latin America, the United States and the inter-American system 
(Boulder: Colorado: Westview, 1980); Hans w. Gatzke, Germany And The United States: a special 
relationship? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Michael H. Hunt, The making o f  a 
special relationship: The United States and China to 1914, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983)
4
definition of a “special relationship” was difficult, due to the above-mentioned ambiguity. 
However ambiguous the term, an attempt must be made to define the term “special 
relationship.” The simplest way to define the “special relationship” was as a bilateral 
relationship, unique in both the quality and quantity of its diplomatic, cultural and 
economic ties. Bruce Russett saw a special relationship as originating in the wartime 
identity of interests. These mutual interests allegedly created a “We-feeling.” A true 
“special relationship” would enable “trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat 
the other’s requests sympathetically.”7 This description may have been as exact as any 
possible.8 Anglo-American relations during the Second World War were as close or 
closer than any other bilateral relationship either country enjoyed during that time frame. 
All of Russett’s conditions were eminently applicable to the Anglo-American relationship 
during the Second World War. Trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat each 
other’s requests sympathetically were seemingly a part of the Anglo-American 
relationship. Thus, approximate continuation of wartime cooperation into the post war 
world would indicate a truly special relationship, independent of wartime expediency.
That said, the purpose of this study is not to determine the existence, duration, and 
maintenance of this special relationship throughout the twentieth century. Rather, the
7 Bruce Russett, Community And Contention: Britain And America In The Twentieth Century, (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1963) p. 27.
8 Some authors have attempted to produce a more informal take on the “special relationship.” Nicholas 
John Cull in Selling War describes the role that reporters, television and newspapers had in the formation of 
the “we-feeling” and a “special relationship.” For a longer range view of the Anglo-American relationship 
consult Christopher Hitchen’s Blood, Class And Nostalgia, as well as David Reynolds and David 
Dimbleby’s An Ocean Apart. Both books stress class and cultural connections as much as political 
relations. Such a centuries-long survey is beyond the scope o f this study. None o f these books, with the 
possible exception o f An Ocean Apart, satisfactorily defines “special relationship.” Nicholas John Cull, 
Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American “Neutrality ’’ In World War II, (Oxford: 
Oxford Press, 1995) Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class And Nostalgia, (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 1990); David Reynolds and David Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart. The Relationship between Britain 
And America In The Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1988)
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purpose of this study is to ask the following questions: did Anglo-American closeness 
survive the war? Was the relationship truly special? This study will show through the 
selective use of primary and secondary documents that this chimera of a special 
relationship was the result of wartime expediency. In the near political vacuum of the 
immediate post-war world, the United States and Great Britain turned away, not toward 
each other.
The story of the Anglo-American relationship during the Second World War was 
not one of equals. It was obvious and accepted in virtually every quarter of Great Britain 
that the United States was the dominant partner. However, the true picture of Britain’s 
political impotence remained shrouded in denial. Many in Britain preferred to see the 
United Kingdom as possessing something intangible and irreplaceable, something that 
would be invaluable to the United States: the seeming ingrained intelligence and 
experience that came from running an empire. Harold Macmillan succinctly summed up 
this philosophy in a 1943 analogy. “W e... are Greeks in this American Empire. “You 
will find Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans- great big, vulgar, bustling 
people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but 
also more corrupt. We must run [the partnership] as the Greek slaves ran the operations 
of the Emperor Claudius.”9 British leaders found to their dismay, however that the 
United States had no use for those kinds of intangibles. The British found that Americans
9 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill And The Wartime Anglo-America Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards 
a New Synthesis” in The ‘Special Relationship, ’ Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull ed, (Oxford: Claredon 
Press, 1986), p. 35 Hitchens, Blood, Class And Nostalgia, p.23.
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neither particularly thought of themselves as the reincarnation of the British Colonial 
Empire, nor needed the expertise that came from running such an endeavor.
The other side of the common British post-war philosophy was that the United 
States owed Britain a debt of gratitude for the effort of holding off Germany from 1939- 
1941, virtually alone. Even when the United States entered the war, Britain still bore the 
brunt of Western combat. In 1942 and 1943, the number of British divisions 
encountering the enemy was 50% higher than the American divisions.10 While the 
United States experienced a booming economy, Britain was being bombed and starved to 
the brink. In addition to the expected gratitude, Britain hoped to parlay this sacrifice into 
close post-war cooperation and aid. Again, British leaders misjudged the United States. 
After putting twelve million men in uniform and sending billions of dollars of aid to its 
allies, American leaders were not inclined to see themselves in debt to Great Britain.
The previous one hundred years had witnessed the relative decline of Britain 
versus the absolute rise of the United States. In 1860, Great Britain produced 19.9% of 
the world’s manufactured goods versus the United States’ 7.2%. By 1928, while Great 
Britain’s Gross Domestic Product had increased ten-fold, its share of the world’s 
manufactured goods had dropped to 9.9%, while the share produced by the United States 
shot up to 39.3%.11 During the Second World War however, as Britain figuratively broke 
up the furniture and threw it on the fire, the United States experienced an incredible 
boom. This resulted in the absolute rise of the American economy and the absolute
10 Anglo-American Economic Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1982) p. 24.
11 B.J.C. McKercher, Transition O f Power: Britain’s Loss O f Global Preeminence To The United States, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999) p.3-4, 323.
decline of the British economy. It was later noted by Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Foreign 
Office permanent Undersecretary, that the longer the war wore on, the more the Big Three 
looked like the Big Two and a Half.12 Great Britain was “Lepidus in the Triumvirate with
1 TMarc Anthony and Augustus.” This problem of rapid decline versus rapid ascension 
created a very real tension throughout the war, which was felt the most in the realm of 
post-war planning. How could two countries plan effectively for the post-war world 
when the positions that they found themselves in changed so rapidly?
However, the greatest barrier to a close post-war Anglo-American special 
relationship was the miscommunication that emanated from the top echelon of policy 
makers, and indirectly, from the relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin 
Roosevelt.
The perceptual basis of a close Anglo-American relationship was the personal 
relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt. Warren Kimball has 
pointed out that if a search committee had chosen wartime leadership, Roosevelt and 
Churchill’s applications would quickly have been slipped into a stack marked “Routine 
Rejection.” Neither seemed to be eminently qualified to fight a war, let alone win one. 
However, the common perception was that after Britain survived the Battle of Britain, 
and after the United States was bombed at Pearl Harbor, both leaders linked arms and 
gloriously and inevitably led the alliance to victory. This fable masked the tension that 
worked on the Anglo-American relationship throughout the war. This tension was
12 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia 
Press, 1981) p. 179.
13 Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, p. 183.
submerged, put off and papered over throughout the war, only to finally explode in a 
cloud of recrimination at the end.14
It is true that Roosevelt and Churchill had a closer relationship than any President 
and Prime Minister ever did. This close relationship, however, had a disadvantage in 
post-war planning. Instead of relying on subordinates to hammer out defined and 
absolute plans and policy, the two leaders often made policy informally. Rather than 
going through official channels with a problem, Churchill often went directly to 
Roosevelt. The problem with this approach in the realm of post-war planning was that 
Roosevelt did not enjoy post-war planning in the least. Roosevelt had a rather mercurial 
personality, given to promising differing advocates o f an issue different things. He was 
often given to making vague, broad promises about the post-war world. Sometimes this 
caused Churchill and the British to read things into American promises that were not 
quite there. Sometimes these promises were executive agreements, such as Roosevelt and 
Churchill’s 1943 agreements at the Quebec Conference to continue Anglo-American 
nuclear cooperation after the war. At other times they were oral promises by Roosevelt 
to Churchill, such as Roosevelt’s promise to make $6.5 billion of Lend-Lease Phase II aid 
available to the British. In either case, the death of Roosevelt and the replacement of 
Churchill at the end of the war left their successors with confusing, uncertain and often 
contradictory plans. Similarly, Cabinet and bureaucratic level underlings were often left 
without direction or with their own agendas. If a relationship is based on uncertainties, 
assumptions and non-binding promises, is it special... and can it survive?
14 Warren F. Kimball, Forged In War: Roosevelt, Churchill And The Second World War, (New 
York: William Morrow and Co., 1997) p. 1-5.
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The two most important areas of Anglo-American post-war planning were in the 
realms of nuclear planning and economics. On both these issues, hung the future power 
of the United States and the future survival of Great Britain. As the two most important 
issues in the Anglo-American relationship, the quality and quantity of nuclear and 
economic relations should be the determining factor as to whether the “special 
relationship’5 actually existed in the immediate post-war world. During the war, there was 
an extraordinary level of cooperation and exchange. A lack of “trust, mutual 
consideration and the ability to treat the other’s requests sympathetically” in these two 
realms of Anglo-American interaction after the war, however indicates that a “special 
relationship” did not exist in that time period.15
The first chapter of this study looks at the Anglo-American nuclear relationship. 
The British were the originators of state-sponsored nuclear research. At the beginning of 
the war, and well into 1942, the British led the United States in research on an atomic 
bomb. By 1943, the United States had caught up and passed the British in research. At 
this point Roosevelt and Churchill made a series of executive agreements that merged the 
projects, and seemed to open the way for continued cooperation after the war. The 
apparent cooperation between the Roosevelt and Churchill, however, masked dissention 
in the opinions of their deputies and underlings. When both leaders left the scene, these 
executive agreements would be called into question by their successors.
By the end of the war, questions about whether or not the United States would stay in 
Europe after the war led many British leaders, most prominently Churchill, to see the
15 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (London: St Martin's 
Press, 1974)
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atomic bomb as the only way to protect British interests and maintain its status as a major 
world player.
In the United States, the death of Roosevelt in April 1945, led to the ascension of 
Harry Truman, who had no clearly formed opinion on the future of nuclear energy. For 
this, the new president looked to his advisors for answers. Persons inside and outside the 
cabinet, who wanted to keep the atomic bomb an American monopoly, largely influenced 
Harry Truman. Individuals who advocated the internationalizing of the atomic bomb led 
the opposition to this group of advisers. Neither group advocated a nuclear partnership 
with Great Britain, or if aware of Roosevelt and Churchill’s wartime agreements, thought 
themselves in any way bound by them
Churchill’s successor, Clement Attlee, who became the Prime Minister in July, 
1945, lacked Churchill’s single-minded commitment to a close Anglo-American 
partnership. Attlee and his advisors incongruously tried to have their cake and eat it too, 
by striving for multi-national control of the bomb, while still trying to get the Americans 
to honor Roosevelt and Churchill’s agreements of a close bilateral sharing of information 
after the war. The ultimate result of this divergence of interests was the complete 
freezing out of Great Britain from post-war nuclear research. This led to the launching of 
Great Britain’s own project and the accusations by both sides of untrustworthiness.
The second chapter of this study examines the economic relationship between the 
United States and Great Britain. During the war, Great Britain was unquestionably in the 
fight of its life. In defeating the Nazis, Britain spent a full quarter of its national wealth, 
and was in debt for nearly as much. Its horrible balance of payments ensured financial 
ruin unless steps were taken to shore up the economy. Throughout the war, Britain
11
leaned heavily on the United States for aid, mainly through Lend-Lease which eventually 
added up to a $20 billion unpaid receipt.16 Many American officials and diplomats were 
eager to use this leverage to pry open Britain’s closed trading bloc, the Imperial 
Preference System. It was thought by many that, only a post-war world with liberalized 
trade and open markets for American goods would prevent the United States from sliding 
into depression. During the war Roosevelt was characteristically eager to aid the British, 
and uneager to worry about post-war plans. In this frame of mind Roosevelt prevented 
the State and Treasury Departments from placing concrete clauses in the Atlantic Charter 
and the Lend-Lease agreement that would eliminate the preference system. Roosevelt 
also fueled British hopes for extended American aid by seemingly agreeing to help 
Britain reconstruct itself and promising aid that in reality only Congress could approve. 
By the end of the war, the American lifeline of aid was taken for granted by Britain. This 
would throw Britain into panic once Truman, either not knowing or not caring about 
Roosevelt’s informal promises, and as required by the Lend-Lease legislation, severed the 
Lend-Lease link. After obtaining a conference on lend-lease and future aid, the British 
were confident that they could easily obtain a large grant-in-aid for rebuilding. In the 
resulting negotiations, the Americans, to the surprise of the British, played hardball 
diplomacy in regards to post-war aid; demanding British trade concessions, refusing 
grants in aid and demanding that any future aid should come in the form of interest- 
bearing loans. Truman and his advisors were determined to create a liberal post-war 
economic framework with the United States as the hegemonic power. A preferential
16 Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects o f  Our International Order, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) p. 208-209.
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partnership with Britain did not figure into the equation. Even though the final aid terms 
were far from onerous, for a British government and people who believed that they had 
contributed, as much, if not more, towards victory relative to the United States, the terms 
were an outrage. To many in the United States, Britain’s ungrateful demeanor was a 
collective slap in the face. There were more recriminations on both sides.
The transition from hostile feelings to close partners during the Second World 
War was more illusion than reality. Both countries needed longer to digest the rapid pace 
of events to create a true “special relationship.” An uncertain relationship was papered 
over by the promises and agreements of Roosevelt and Churchill. Without their steadying 
hands, American avarice and British blunders led to mutual raw feelings. This being the 
case, this study shows that contrary to the view of many historians, diplomats and leaders, 
a “special relationship” did not exist between the United States and Great Britain in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War.
13
PARTI
THE PROBLEM OF ANGLO-AMERICAN NUCLEAR RELATIONS
14
The response to this greatest o f  all triumphs o f  scientific method and creative intelligence had been in some 
respects closely akin to the practice o f  magic among the most primitive o f  tribes. Having in their 
possession a fearful image o f  the god o f  war, which makes them stronger than their enemies, the tribe is 
obsessed with the fear that the image may be stolen or duplicated and their exclusive right to the Deities 
favor lost. So a temple is built, ringed around by walls and guarded by untiring sentinels. Those whose 
function it is to attend the deity are carefully chosen and subjected to purification rights; they are 
forbidden to ever look upon the whole image or speak o f  what they have seen. They are guarded with 
unceasing vigilance and at the slightest sign o f  defection condign punishment is visited upon them.17
In the course of the Second World War, the United States and Great Britain were 
perceived to be brothers at arms. With the threat of the two monstrosities of Nazi 
Germany and Imperial Japan ever present, differences in opinion and inter-allied friction 
were quieted and placated as best as possible. To many American leaders such as like 
Franklin Roosevelt, the future of the alliance would work itself out in due course; in the 
meantime Britain could be pacified, as needed, with vague promises and banalities. To 
most Britons, especially Winston Churchill, their fate in a post-war world was an ever­
present shadow that demanded concrete commitments and assurances.
17Margaret Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 321.
15
In many areas, these differing doctrines of inquiry and placation led to large scale 
confusion and resentment after the war. Nuclear development was a prime example of 
one of these areas. During the Second World War, both American and British scientists 
worked on the Manhattan project in the quest for the atomic bomb. Following several 
agreements and promises, the unprecedented nuclear partnership to all outward 
appearances seemed destined to outlast the war. This nuclear partnership would seem to 
have been a clear manifestation of the “special relationship” between the United States 
and Great Britain. However, within a year of the first use of the atomic bomb on Japan, 
the British had been completely excluded from American atomic research. Why was 
atomic energy a main point of contention after the war? The problems in the Anglo- 
American nuclear relationship were symptomatic of the British proclivity for pursuing a 
course of bilateral control with the United States, while they put their trust into the 
informal promises of Franklin Roosevelt. The British government quickly found out that 
the United States was interested in unilateral hegemony, and would soon neglect their 
wartime promises. These incompatible elements prevented a “special relationship” in 
Anglo-American nuclear relations.
16
Prelude
The foundations of the atomic bomb flow through the history of physics. The first 
real breakthrough towards the realization of nuclear power came at a Swedish resort in 
1938. Lise Meiter, a refugee, Austrian-Jew, with help from her partner Chemist Otto 
Hahn, theorized that a neutron could split a nucleus. This was fission, the basis of the 
atomic bomb. In theory, the split of the nucleus would release an enormous amount of 
energy and an additional neutron. Her work was to influence a great deal of others,
1 o
including the legendary Danish physicist, and discoverer of the neutron, Niels Bohr.
In 1939, Bohr reinforced Meitner’s theory by publishing the theory of uranium 
nuclear fission. In this paper he laid out the foundation of nuclear energy.19 Recent work 
by Enrico Fermi also pointed to similar conclusions. Two refugee scientists living in 
England, Otto Frisch (who was Meitner’s nephew) and Rudolph Peierls, wrote a 
memorandum showing how Uranium 235 could react violently to create a quick fission 
capable of releasing vast amounts of energy. A neutron splitting one atom could release 
two other neutrons. These neutrons would split two more atoms and so on. This was 
known as a chain reaction. The cumulative result would be the release of an enormous 
amount of energy. They specifically pointed out how a five-kilogram “super bomb” 
could effect the same explosive force as several thousand pounds of dynamite.20 This
18 Richard Rhodes, The Making o f  the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 253-254
19 M. Gowing, “Britain, America And the Bomb” from British Foreign Policy, 1945-56., ed. John Young 
and Michael Dockill (London: Macmillan, 1989) p. 32.
20 M. Gowing, Britain And Atomic Energy (London: Macmillan, 1964), Appendix 1 “The Frisch-Peierls 
Memorandum”.
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memo had a great impact on the British government and quickly led to the forming of the
9 1Maud Committee. The committee goal was to research the possibility of an atomic 
bomb. They ran into one wall right away. Only .7% of uranium ore is the U235 isotope, 
while 99.3% is the slower reacting U238 isotope. Separating the two seemed an 
impossible task. This problem was solved when, with the fall of France, two leading
French physicists fled to England. These two scientists had developed a method for
22extracting U235 using uranium oxide and heavy water. With them, they spirited away
9T50 gallons of heavy water in tin cans. These cans contained most of the world’s supply. 
This discovery put the British light years ahead in the nuclear race.
To most of the physicists contemplating the creation of a bomb, the most pressing 
fear was that Germany would obtain the bomb before the Allies. This fear was 
heightened in 1940, when Germany overran Norway. Norway was home to the only plant 
in the world then equipped to produce heavy water. The fear was compounded by the fact 
that the brilliant German physicist Wemer Heisenberg had been chosen to head the 
German nuclear project.24 For most of the war, the Manhattan Project operated under the 
assumption that the German project was proceeding at a similar pace. It was not until 
Allied troops overran German research centers that American and British leaders realized
21 The name MAUD is not an acronym, but a reference to a telegram sent by Lise Meitner. The telegram 
read “MET NIELS AND MARGRETHE RECENTLY BOTH WELL BUT UNHAPPY ABOUT EVENTS 
PLEASE INFORM COCKCROFT AND MAUD RAY KENT.” Maud Ray Kent was taken to be an 
anagram for “’’radium taken,” a reference to the German nuclear project. It was later that the committee 
learned Maude Ray was a governess living in Kent who taught Bohr’s sons English. R. Rhodes, The 
Making O f The Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 362.
22 Heavy water is H 20 in which the hydrogen carries an extra neutron.
23 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 58.
24 War can lead to many incongruities. Heisenberg’s life was one o f them. He had been the star pupil of 
Niels Bohr, and a close friend to Enrico Fermi. The thought o f Heisenberg in charge o f the German atomic 
project inspired terror in the hearts o f his former colleagues. Bohr, who was unbeknownst to most, half- 
Jewish, refused to participate in the German project after Denmark was overrun and later, fled to America.
18
that Germany had progressed very little since the beginning of the war. It turned out that 
Hitler, despite his love of “secret weapons,” had never liked the idea of nuclear physics.
It seems that he was convinced that such scientific work such as Einstein’s theory of 
relativity was “Jewish Physics.” It was the fear of the German project that gave the 
main impetus to build an Allied bomb. The United States and Britain would have 
different luck with the Soviet Union in that regard.
By 1941, the MAUD Committee was able to show with good certainty that an 
atomic bomb would work. Meanwhile physicists in the United States had not been idly 
sitting on their hands. Refugee physicist Leo Szilard immediately saw the potential of a 
bomb and persuaded Albert Einstein to write his now famous letter to Franklin Roosevelt 
about it. Roosevelt’s reply to Einstein indicated that he had already set into motion what 
would become the enormous $2 billion Manhattan project. The United States was still 
neutral, and the research would not take on its extreme importance for a couple years.
After reading the MAUD report the Americans suddenly became interested in 
collaboration, and in 1941 they proposed a jointly controlled project with the British. The 
British treated this proposition condescendingly. At the time, they were confident of their 
own ability to build a bomb alone, or in concert with Canada. Some distrust of American 
intentions and of American security contributed to this. The manifested problem was that 
while the British had a plentiful supply of theoretical physicists, they lacked the 
engineering expertise and resources of the United States.
Fermi had to flee Italy, to the United States, because o f fear for the safety o f his Jewish wife. Still, 
Heisenberg was somehow able to rationalize his work for Nazi Germany.
25G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, (New York: Knopf, 1990) p.287.
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How would the war partnership have been if the British had accepted an American 
partnership in 1941? It is impossible to know, although several British historians have 
implied that the British could have arranged a more or less equal basis if they had jumped
<y zr
on “the bus.” American historians tend to dismiss this view as overly optimistic. While 
the British were reasonably forthright about sharing their theoretical research with 
American scientists, American research was top secret. It was almost certainly clear to 
Vannevar Bush: the director of the Office of Scientific Research that the Americans 
would certainly be able to catch up with whatever theoretical progression the British had 
made, relatively quickly. Bush had a good reason to think that. In fact, a great bulk of 
the theoretical work on nuclear fission could be read in numerous scientific journals.
Until the Manhattan project got under full swing, scientists had continued to publish their 
work. Also, American production potential severely outdistanced Britain. Moreover, the 
United States would inevitably have taken on the superior burden of production and 
demanded the superior return. There is no reason to believe that a partnership in 1941 
would not have produced the same results as the future partnership did in 1943.
26 Margaret Gowing, the official historian o f Great Britain’s atomic project is the most prominent o f these. 
M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 (London: St Martin's 
Press, 1974)
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The Partnership
By late 1942, the British realized the limitations of their program. They were 
struggling to come up with a test unit; meanwhile the Americans had made a quantum 
leap ahead in the nuclear development race. The Manhattan Project, headed by General 
Leslie Groves and Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, was already underway. The decision to 
build the bomb and the project that accompanied it was taken by Roosevelt alone. 
Congress was not to be informed nor consulted in any way, shape, or form. The most 
brilliant minds in the United States were sequestered for the atomic quest.
A convincing argument can be made that the Manhattan Project assembled the 
greatest collection of geniuses ever for a single project. Included among these were such 
Nobel Laureates as Ernest Lawrence, Edward Teller, Enrico Fermi, and later Niels Bohr. 
With them were hundreds of the country’s most accomplished scientists and engineers. 
The project was split between two main centers and several smaller research points. The 
site at Los Alamos, New Mexico would be the command facility where the actual atomic 
bombs were invented and produced. The new top-secret facility being constructed at Oak 
Ridge, Tennessee, was to produce the plutonium and uranium 235 for the bombs. Other 
centers such as the University of Chicago and Columbia University would work on 
smaller, related projects. Furthermore, unlike Britain, the United States Government put 
the military in charge of every aspect of the Manhattan Project. American scientists were
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to act as employees. The scientists were encouraged to think of themselves as fighting 
the war much like the GIs in the field. Similarly though, the government did not solicit 
strategic advice from regular grunts, neither did they ask scientists for their advice on the 
strategies and uses of the bomb. The executive branch made policy, and the so-called 
“Top Policy Group” would give advice. By early 1942, they had worked out a tentative 
schedule for when the bomb would be ready. Vannevar Bush predicted an atomic bomb 
by early 1945, despite the fact that it had yet to be conclusively proven, experimentally, 
that a chain reaction was even possible.
The British scientists, meanwhile, ran their project themselves. It was they who 
decided if the bomb should be built, and the ethics of using it. As pioneering as they had 
been in the formulation of nuclear physics and the theorizing of the atomic bomb, it soon 
became clear that the besieged nation had not nearly enough resources to create the 
nuclear bomb. Winston Churchill wrote to Franklin Roosevelt about sharing nuclear 
information in late 1942. The President’s main scientific advisors, Bush and Harvard 
president James Conant, dissuaded Roosevelt from sharing anything more than basic 
scientific theories with the British. They reasoned that little would be gained by 
collaborating with the British since the American program was so far ahead. At the same 
time, sharing technical “know how” could be vulnerable to security breaches.
Furthermore, Secretary of War Henry Stimson pointed out that an agreement between the 
British and Soviets to share information on all new weapons could threaten the security of
27 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 292-294.
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9 Rthe project. As a further disincentive for cooperation, the United States brass did not
9Qtrust the Free French among the British contingent and also considered them a risk.
Roosevelt deferred to Churchill until 1943, where at Quebec he signed an 
agreement that the British thought would bring them into a partnership with the 
Americans. This led to the possibility of British participation in the American project and 
to joint exploitation of uranium. The Quebec Agreement had four important provisions. 
The first was that neither side would use the bomb against a third party without the 
other’s consent. The second was a clause setting up the Combined Policy Committee to 
coordinate and control the joint acquisition of fissionable materials. The third provided 
for the interchange of information relating to atomic energy, a provision at the discretion 
of the United States and set to expire after victory was achieved. The fourth was that the 
President of the United States would dictate any post-war atomic collaboration of an 
industrial or commercial character. Immediately afterwards, most of the British 
physicists joined the Manhattan project in a limited role. The British no longer 
maintained a native project, and had been decidedly placed in a junior partner status 
compared to the United States. This agreement was followed later by a top secret Aide- 
Memoire between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at Hyde Park, New York on 
September 18, 1944. This statement included the ambiguous provision that “Full 
collaboration between the United States and British Government in developing [Atomic
28 G. Herken, “American Diplomacy And The Atomic Bomb, 1945-1947.” (Princeton, 1974) p. 6.
29 The American leadership was never to trust the French in any capacity, even after the war. However the 
British as well actively supported concealing all nuclear information from French leaders after liberation, 
even though the French had several patent claims relating to the atomic research. British leaders could have 
later looked on this with irony when they were complaining o f U.S. officials o f having information withheld 
from them, despite their contributions. “Minutes o f the January 22, 1945 Combined Policy Committee,” 
Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office 1967), 1945, II, 2-5.
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Energy] for military and commercial purposes should continue after the defeat of Japan 
unless and until terminated by joint agreement.” 30 The road to continued Anglo- 
American cooperation seemed to run far past the war.
The Man behind the Curtain
Major General Leslie Groves was a formidable figure. As the head of the 
Manhattan project, he made his reputation as a tough, secretive and jingoistic man. He 
was always just out of the public eye, but nonetheless always pulling the strings. Groves’ 
position as sole head of the Manhattan project gave him unprecedented influence with the 
executive branch in the areas of foreign policy. It was he to whom the President and 
cabinet turned to for answers on the progress of the bomb. He in turn answered on all 
things, only to the President and chief of staff It was also Groves who dictated which 
scientists worked on what, including British scientists as of 1943. This was a great deal 
of influence for a man who before the war had been a colonel in the Army Engineers. But 
it was for his remarkable organizational skills that Groves was chosen to head one of the
30Department of State, “Aide-Memoire on TUBE ALLOYS”, Foreign Relations O f The United States 
(Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1944, Quebec Conference, 492-493.
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most significant undertakings in human history. He was not unaware of his position or 
his power, and definitely had a plan in mind on what to do with it.
Groves, however, did not consider himself constricted to planning only for the 
war. As director, part of his job was to acquire adequate uranium for the project. His 
first concern was to obtain uranium that could otherwise fall in to the hands of the 
Germans. But he was thinking past the war. Unlike other American leaders enamoured 
by the Soviet Union during their brief partnership, Groves remained both hostile and 
skeptical with regards to the Soviets. He also failed to see the role of the Manhattan 
project as limited to making a small number of bombs in order to defeat Japan. Instead, 
he envisioned building up a massive industrial base, capable of turning out large numbers 
of atomic bombs after the war. In October 1945, Groves wrote a secret report that 
concluded, “we [should] not permit any foreign power with which we are not firmly 
allied, and in which we do not have absolute confidence, to make or possess atomic
weapons. If such an country started to make atomic weapons, we [should] destroy its
• ^  1capacity to threaten us before it had progressed far enough to threaten us.” In other
words, Groves advocated a preemptive strike. The Soviet Union, being the only enemy
with the power and ideology to threaten the United States, was the most likely future
candidate for use of the proposed legions of bombs. Adequate uranium was the first step
towards this goal. In this role, he was soon to shape the pattern of American nuclear
policy.
31 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 
224.
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Groves would not settle for just getting “adequate” uranium. His goal was nothing 
less than the entire world supply of high-grade uranium. His personal goal was to ensure 
that the atomic bomb was solely an American monopoly, not only during, but also after 
the war. As he articulated it, “insuring that the postwar position of the United States in 
the field of atomic energy would not be unfavorable.”32 The most expedient way for 
maintaining a monopoly of atomic bombs after the war was for the United States to 
maintain a monopoly over high-grade uranium. In his quest for an American monopoly 
of nuclear materials, Groves initiated a covert operation to identify and purchase uranium 
ore around the world. It proved relatively successful. Taking into account that the only 
previous use for uranium was as a dye, many neutral countries readily sold what they had. 
This program was code-named Murray Hill Area and was directed personally by Groves. 
In fact, he had such control over the finances that money for the program was channeled 
directly into his personal bank account to avoid detection from spies, or for that matter, 
Congress. In that way, Groves was able to lock up a huge portion of uranium for 
American use.
Groves had to contend with one major fly in the ointment. A significant portion 
of uranium was located within the British Commonwealth, making collaboration with the 
British a requirement to obtain that material. This was accomplished by the Quebec 
Agreement, which created the Combined Policy Committee to oversee purchase of 
uranium from neutral countries. This committee was comprised of three Americans, two 
Britons and one Canadian. An offshoot of this was the Combined Development Trust.
32 L. Groves, Now It Can Be Told (New York: Harper & Row 1962), 285-6.
33 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York: Knopf, 1981), p. 101.
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The Hyde Park “Agreement and Declaration of Trust” created the Trust. The Chairman 
was, of course, Major General Leslie Groves.34 The purpose of the Trust was to ensure 
joint control of uranium deposits under British dominion, but not yet in the stockpile of 
the Manhattan project. Technically the Trust was supposed to work on a need basis 
between the two countries. Of course during the war, only the United States actually 
needed the uranium. Groves had great influence over the Combined Policy Committee as 
well, even though he was not a member.
To Groves, the Anglo- American nuclear partnership was a marriage of 
convenience destined to end after the war. However, the British were helping to bring in 
a considerable amount of uranium and could not be ignored. In addition to their 
resources in South Africa and India, the British had been critical in obtaining a lease on
S'the uranium of the Belgian Congo/" In their uranium, the British had their only 
bargaining chip. Leslie Groves wanted to change this. For Groves, the goal was an 
American monopoly of uranium.
34 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1966), 1944, vol. II, p. 1026
35 R. Hewlett, A New World (College Park, 1962), p. 285.
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A Furnace for the Fuel
Leslie Groves’ goal was a monopoly of the atomic bomb after the war: a nuclear 
Pax-Americana, or more precisely, a Hegemonie des Etats-Unis. There were two obvious 
rivals who could challenge this. The most obvious and most threatening was the Soviet 
Union. Groves did not have any real geographic evidence of how much uranium the 
USSR had, but he confidently told Harry Truman that it would take 20 years for the 
Soviets to attain a Hiroshima type bomb.36 He reasoned that it would take that long for 
the Soviets to develop uranium-refining techniques able to exploit the low-grade deposits 
they had. Groves was confident that the Murray Hill Area project would capture all of the 
world’s high-grade uranium.
The other nation was obviously Great Britain. The British were actively pursuing 
nuclear information for both weapons and energy. The British had the uranium access to 
build bombs or reactors. What they lacked was what became popularly known as 
scientific “ know how.” More precisely, they lacked the actual engineering information 
on how to build the bomb. Larger scale correlates to a higher complexity. A 12-year-old 
could build a simple rocket capable of taking off. Yet, it took decades to build one 
capable of escaping the earth’s atmosphere. While the aeronautical theories for both 
rockets are virtually the same; the engineering is staggeringly different. The same
36 In 1954, Groves admitted to a congressional committee that in his calculations, he had overlooked Soviet 
access to uranium in Eastern Europe. The Soviets had detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, 16 years earlier 
than Groves had predicted. G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 341.
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correlation could be made between relatively small experiments involved in splitting 
atoms, and the atomic bomb. The British already had the theoretical knowledge, but 
having the theoretical knowledge did not correlate to having the skill and resources to 
actually build a bomb. The British scientists working on the Manhattan project provided 
theoretical and technical help, but were shut out of much of the work on the more 
sensitive engineering stages at Los Alamos.
In 1945, the problem at hand for new British Prime Minister Clement Attlee was that 
the British had the “fuel but not the furnace.” The recent victory over Japan, under the terms 
of the Quebec agreement, halted what little nuclear information they had been receiving, 
since it was an exclusively wartime agreement. The recent death of Franklin Roosevelt and 
the electoral defeat of Winston Churchill left the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire in question.
With this, both the United States and Britain were in a bind. The British wanted the Hyde 
Park “full post-war collaboration “ clause revalidated. Without this insurance, they could 
not count on American nuclear information. The Quebec Agreement put the fate of their 
post-war program in the hands of Harry Truman. On the other hand, the Americans led by 
Groves wanted to continue their grip on the Combined Development Trust.
The Quebec agreement, however, had a very worrisome stipulation for the United 
States. The United States was bound to consult with Britain and Canada before using an 
atomic bomb. This would have been politically embarrassing to Harry Truman had it 
come to the attention of the public. So the United States’ conundrum was how to 
maintain a monopoly of nuclear information and uranium while changing the consultation
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7 7clause. It was clear to both sides that the Quebec Agreement would have to be re­
negotiated.
The Cabinet Divided
As Truman came into the Presidency, his opinions on the nuclear bomb were still 
rather malleable. He relied mostly on his advisors to show him the path to follow. These 
advisors could be divided into two categories, monopolists and internationalists. While 
monopolists saw the atomic miracle as being solely an American responsibility, and to 
many a diplomatic lever, the internationalists believed that hoarding the atom was futile. 
The internationalists reasoned that it was only a matter of time before the Soviet Union 
and others learned the secret. It was the duty of the United States to see that it came 
under the responsible control of the world. The monopolists were strong proponents of a 
strong unilateral role for the United States in the post-war world. The internationalists 
believed that the bomb, and the United States, belonged in a strong multilateral 
framework. In the monopolist wing, Leslie Groves was the strongest force, yet however 
strong his ambition and personality, he would not be able to get his way without an ally 
close to the President. Groves found his ally in Secretary of State James Byrnes. The 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, and Vannevar Bush led the internationalists. Despite
37 “Memorandum by the director o f the Office o f Scientific Research and Development (Bush) to the 
Secretary o f State” Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1967), 1945, Vol. II, 69-70.
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agreeing in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, Byrnes and Stimson soon came to 
believe in opposite uses for the bomb.
James “Jimmy” Byrnes had almost become President. The son of Irish 
immigrants, James Byrnes was an ambitious young lawyer when he was elected to the 
United States House of Representatives in 1910. From there, he moved across the 
Capitol Building to the senate in 1930. In 1941, Byrnes was appointed to the Supreme 
Court. He left the bench shortly after war broke out to become head of the Office of 
Economic Stabilization. He later became director of the war mobilization effort, where 
Roosevelt described him as an assistant president for the home front. Many expected him 
to be tapped as Roosevelt’s running mate in 1944. Roosevelt however passed him over 
for both Vice President, and Secretary of State. Byrnes was a smooth talking old 
fashion fixer. One Congressman noted “When I see Jimmy Byrnes coming, I put one 
hand on my watch, the other on my wallet, and wish to goodness I knew how to protect 
my conscience.”39
When Truman appointed him to be his first secretary of state, Byrnes was 
determined to fix the international sphere, just as he believed he had repaired the 
domestic one. He was a great believer in forceful individual diplomacy, but early on the 
Soviets seemed rather intransigent on issues such as Eastern Europe. The problem State 
Department diplomat George Kennan noted with Byrnes was that he tended to play 
negotiations by ear, without any set plan or agenda. Kennan’s colleague, Charles Bohlen,
38 Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain And The Cold War, 1944-1947, (Columbia: 
University o f Missouri Press, 1981) p. 88.
39 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia 
Press, 1981) p. 149.
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explained Byrnes’ problems dealing with the Soviets as a matter o f perspective. Byrnes 
had dealt with Congress where compromises worked because everyone played in the 
same system by the same rules, something Byrnes found absent in foreign affairs.40 Thus, 
the atomic bomb seemed a blessing for Byrnes. He was tired of haggling over everything 
with the Soviet Union and getting nowhere. He was convinced that the atomic bomb 
could prod the Soviets in directions that they would not otherwise go. Groves’ rosy 
predictions of future American monopoly of the bomb made Byrnes eager to try his hand 
at nuclear diplomacy. Byrnes was not alone in this belief in the efficacy of atomic 
diplomacy. Stimson and Truman also thought early on that the bomb could be a concrete 
lever in persuading the Soviets to democratize Eastern Europe, and possibly initiate 
internal reforms within the Soviet Union. It was nai’ve to think that Stalin would accept 
internal reforms pushed on him by the Americans, after sacrificing almost 20 million 
Soviet civilians in fighting Germany. No matter how powerful he thought the bomb was, 
Stalin surely did not think it would be any more destructive than the Nazi invasion. In 
spite of this, Jimmy Byrnes thought that with an extended American atomic monopoly the 
Soviets would see things in a different light.41
The venerable, outgoing Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, led the 
internationalists. The old New Yorker’s political life had spanned the entirety of the first 
half of the twentieth century. Stimson was a confidant and friend to Teddy Roosevelt.
He had served as Secretary of War to Taft, Governor General to the Philippines under
40 Terry H. Anderson, The United States, Great Britain And The Cold War,1944-1947, (Columbia: 
University o f Missouri Press, 1981) p. 89, George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950, (Boston: Little, Brown, 
1967) p 287-288.
41 Gregg Herken, Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992) p. 32
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Coolidge, and Secretary of State to Hoover. Stimson was unarguably the most respected 
cabinet member.42
Stimson, like many, was a monopolist in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
However, his opinion changed after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed. In today’s 
light, Stimson could be seen as somewhat of an oracle relating to the atomic bomb. In a 
letter to Truman, he not only predicted the arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, but also predicted that the Soviets could get an atomic bomb by 1949. 
Stimson had been among the first to advocate the use of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic 
lever. He soon came to reconsider his position. He likened the bomb to a “royal flush,” 
and that the United States had been “too lavish with our beneficence upon [Russia].”43 
After a few weeks, Stimson began to see the atomic bomb as something apart than just a 
greater conventional weapon. He likened it to man harnessing the heart of nature itself. 
The impression of Byrnes swaggering around with a “bomb in his pocket” disturbed him. 
Still, Stimson was ardently anti-Communist and fervently believed that the Soviet Union 
was an amoral dictatorship. He personally grappled with how it would be possible to 
move the Soviet Union in the direction of freedom. After some personal reflection, his 
conclusion was astonishing. He decided to advocate the use of the atomic bomb, not by 
dropping it, but by sharing it. He pointed out that Britain was already a partner of sorts. 
He predicted, “Unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership, we would 
maintain an Anglo-American bloc over against the Soviet.” He predicted that the result 
would be “a secret armaments race of a rather desperate character.” “If we feel, as I
42 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 358.
43 Ibid.. p. 347.
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assume we must, that civilization demands that some day we arrive at a satisfactory 
international arrangement respecting the control of this new force, the question then is 
how long we can afford our momentary superiority.”44
Stimson proposed that the United States should, along with Britain, offer to the 
Soviet Union entree into a collaborative effort that would limit the use of the atomic 
bomb in war, and encourage the use of peaceful atomic power. One of Stimson’s favorite 
sayings was that the only way to get a trustworthy man, was to trust him. He seemed to 
be carrying this point to the Soviet Union. Unlike Byrnes and Groves, he thought that the 
Soviets would only respond positively to trust and not threats. In a candid meeting with 
Truman on September 4, 1945, Stimson told the President that there were risks in both 
his and Byrnes’s plans. He concluded though, that “in my method there was less danger 
than in his and also we would be on the right path towards... international world, whereas 
with his we would be on the wrong path in that respect and tending to revert into power 
politics.” He advocated eventually setting up an international commission, possibly 
under the new United Nations, to control nuclear information. Incoming Secretary of 
War Robert Patterson and Vannevar Bush backed up Stimson in these opinions.45 Bush, 
alluding to the analogy that the atomic bomb was the gun on Byrnes’s hip, warned 
Truman “there is no powder in the gun, for it could not be drawn, and this is certainty 
known.”46 The inherent problem was the fact that Stimson was 78 and retiring. Plus it 
was Byrnes, not Stimson, whose job it was to make foreign policy. Stimson led the
44 Ibid., p 356-58.
45 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, pg. 11 and 41.
46 G. Hodgeson, The Colonel, p. 355.
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organization that was responsible for building the bomb; Byrnes would decide how to use 
it diplomatically with regard to the Soviets.
The Problem with Harry
It was not clear what Franklin Roosevelt’s plans were for post-war Anglo- 
American cooperation. He left little to no notes or instructions; FDR was 
characteristically secretive about it. As usual, many of Roosevelt’s guarantees to the 
British were executive agreements, such as the Hyde Park Agreement. These pacts did 
not necessarily apply to Harry Truman and he was not obligated to honor them. A 
suitable bad omen for the British was that a filing clerk in the United States mistook the 
British code word for the nuclear project, Tube Alloys, on the Hyde Park agreement, as 
having something to do with torpedoes. The agreement was promptly misfiled. The 
British would later have to convince Truman with their copy of the document.47
Truman himself never seemed to fully understand the consequences of his actions, 
or the importance of the various agreements and uranium supplies. For this he leaned
47 The misfiled Hyde Park agreement would not be found until 1952. The only Americans to know about 
the agreement at the Washington Conference would be Leslie Groves and Vannevar Bush, neither o f whom 
were exactly British allies. There was suspicion that Groves had a copy which he did not share with 
Truman. G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 62.
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heavily on Byrnes and Groves. He saw Stimson’s point of the altruistic merit of a world 
bettered by nuclear energy. Truman also saw effective international control as the safest 
way to protect the world. But the international control of Stimson’s plan would involve 
the blatant giving away of the secret to the Soviet Union. Every one of Truman’s 
political instincts called out against giving the bomb to the Russians. Truman wanted to 
believe that they might never get the bomb, or they would not get it for many years. 
Groves and Byrnes’s counsel was simply easier to follow. First and foremost, Harry 
Truman had always been a politician. He sensed correctly that the American people were 
in no mood to give away their hard-eamed wonder. In addition, Truman wanted to 
believe Byrnes in that the atomic bomb could be used as the ultimate diplomatic card. He 
decided to take the diplomatic offensive against the Soviets.
The first atomic explosion at Alamogordo coincided with the Potsdam peace 
talks. Truman was given the news on the morning of July 21. Truman took the 
opportunity to play nuclear diplomacy for first time in history. He approached Stalin and 
warned him that the United States possessed a weapon of unusual and destructive force. 
Instead of inquiring further, Stalin simply responded that he hoped the United States 
would make good use of it. This was taken by many of Truman’s senior advisors to
mean that Stalin was underestimating the bomb. The truth of it was, that because of spies 
within the Manhattan project, Stalin had known of the bomb’s existence and potential 
long before Truman. The Soviets were well underway with their own bomb program. 
After the bombs were finally dropped, many expected the Soviets to become far less
48 G. Hodgson, The Colonel, p.335.
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intractable in negotiations. In the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima, it seemed like they 
had. When the United States did not include the Soviets in the occupational forces of 
Japan, after some expected noise and protestations, Stalin acquiesced. When Truman 
pressured the Soviets to give Manchuria to Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists, they agreed.49
There was a seemingly new forcefulness in American diplomacy because of the 
bomb. By the same token, the Soviets appeared to become less obstinate in their 
demands. To Washington, it seemed that the Soviets were genuinely afraid of the 
bomb.50 This early test seemed to confirm the merits of an atomic monopoly. If the 
international community controlled the bomb, the Soviets would be less afraid of The 
United States, and thus less willing compromise on issues. Or that is what the logic of 
the situation seemed to dictate. Thus Harry Truman decided from early on that the United 
States must be the only nation to possess the bomb. Thanks to Groves’ predictions, 
Truman thought that it would maintain status quo for a long time. A victory for the 
monopolists would necessarily be a defeat for the British. Thus after the war, the British 
were operating at a distinct disadvantage.
49 G. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, (New York: Penguin, 1985) p. 240-242.
50 The likely reality is logic. Stalin believed that immediate conventional strength was paramount. His 
concessions were made in East Asia, where America outnumbered the Soviets
in troops, not to mention had overwhelming air and sea power. Stalin, always a very calculating man, likely 
thought it was unwise to challenge America at its point o f strength.
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The Internationalist Monopolist
Winston Churchill was always full o f nostalgia for the old empire. He often chose 
to see the United States as a trusted partner that valued British friendship, a point of view 
that was often facilitated by Roosevelt’s flattery. Churchill was no innocent though. He 
knew that to survive as a world player, Great Britain would have to maintain very close 
ties with the United States. Churchill desperately wanted to see the agreements with the 
United States as a binding prelude to a lasting partnership. Unfortunately most of the 
agreements Churchill had made were ambiguous at best. The Hyde Park agreement was 
a good example of this, a secret executive agreement with little to no contractual 
obligation after Roosevelt’s presidency. But through all his romantic failings and 
ambiguous deals, Churchill knew what he wanted. A secret, non-binding agreement or 
not, the Hyde Park Aide-Memoire was a concerted effort by Churchill to gain British 
access to nuclear information after the war. After victory, his most consistent and 
pressing goal was to deliver the bomb to Britain. Churchill understood the magnitude of 
the bomb from the beginning. He also pragmatically understood that there was no 
guarantee that the United States would not retreat into isolation after the war, leaving 
Britain potentially standing alone against the Soviet colossus. Churchill rationalized that 
the only tool the depleted Britain would be able to use to keep a reasonable balance of 
power was the bomb. However, few in the administration of Harry Truman were overly 
sensitive about Britain’s postwar ambitions. There was an abundance of realists and a
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number of anglophobes among them. Churchill was well aware of this, and pressed 
Truman for greater involvement. He and his advisors also believed that an enduring 
nuclear bond with the United States would make it harder for it to recede into the 
isolation Britain feared.51
In Churchill’s wartime coalition government, his Deputy Prime Minister was the 
leader of the Labour party, Clement Attlee. Like Roosevelt with his Vice-Presidents, 
Churchill never informed Attlee of the making of the atomic bomb during the war years. 
This was to have unfavorable results for the British. Though Churchill won the war, the 
British public felt that Labour could better win the peace. In the summer of 1945 Labour, 
led by Attlee, defeated Churchill and the Conservatives. Only then did Churchill inform 
Attlee. This change of governments threatened to alter government policy towards 
nuclear energy. Churchill was, above all, an unequivocal non-believer in international 
control. His position was that Britain would be best served by a mutual pact with the 
United States, perhaps including Canada. Attlee muddied the waters. It was obvious that 
the destructive force unleashed upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki awed him. After the 
dropping of the bombs he sent a telegram to Truman outlining his views. He saw the 
atomic bomb as fundamentally changing the face of war forever. He stated in the 
telegram that the “framework of which was erected at [the conference creating the United 
Nations in] San Francisco must be carried much further if it is to be an effective shelter 
for humanity.” Clement Attlee therefore started out as a nuclear internationalist. In 
Attlee’s letter to Truman, he also suggested a conference on the international control of
51 Jerry Brookshire, Clement Attlee, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 1995-196.
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nuclear energy with both him and the Prime Minister of Canada, Mackenzie King. 
Truman agreed to a tripartite conference at Washington DC from November 10-16.52
Preparing for the Conference
Before leaving for the conference, Attlee circulated a memorandum to his cabinet, 
summarizing his position on the future of British nuclear research. The memorandum 
provided a remarkable picture of Attlee, who seemed to have blended idealism, realism 
and naivete. He started with a general thesis, which contained the rather curious logic: 
that since nuclear war can only lead to mutual destruction, “It is therefore that the 
powerful nations of the world should plainly recognize this fact and abandon all out-of- 
date ideas of power politics.” This was a particularly naive general thesis to use. The 
United States counted on power politics to remain the lingua franca of diplomacy, 
obviously to its tremendous advantage. Attlee built upon this general thesis in his further 
points of the memorandum. In pronouncing power politics dead, Attlee assumed that the 
United Nations would be a very powerful force in the future. This, of course, was not to
52 Department o f State, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, p. 59.
53 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex A, Nov 5, 1945
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be true either. So through the points of the memorandum, Attlee suggested ways to make 
civilization safe from the bomb, all of which were based on an underestimation of the life 
span of power politics and an overestimation of the future power of the United Nations. 
Most surprising of all, was that Attlee, after all his points of international control and 
safeguarding man-kind, stated that he would ask the President to continue the bilateral 
cooperation set up by the Quebec Agreement while having Clause 4 removed. Attlee was 
caught in the paradox of propagating an effective world government, and at the same time 
trying to obtain as big a piece of the nuclear pie as possible for Britain.54
Churchill recognized this problem, and in a letter to Attlee recommended 
abandoning thoughts of international control in order to strengthen Britain’s relationship 
with the U.S. “I should regret if we seemed not to value this and pressed them to meld 
our dual agreement down into a general international agreement consisting, I fear, of 
pious empty phrases and undertakings.. .which will not be carried out.”55 Clement 
Attlee’s paradoxical priorities would not help the already tenuous British cause.
54 Ibid.. Annex C,D
55 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 66.
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A Talk on the Potomac
The Washington Conference was to have a two pronged approach: the diplomatic 
pleasantries of the three leaders, and the real negotiating done by their subordinates. The 
physicist Sir John Anderson and Field Marshall Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, both member 
of the Combined Policy Committee, led the British negotiators. Byrnes, Groves, Bush 
and Patterson led the American negotiators.
The first British draft of an agreement echoed most of the sentiments Attlee 
displayed in his general thesis. Many of clauses were ones the United States could not 
possibly agree to. Clause 5 and 6 proposed that a system of scientific visitation to nuclear 
facilities by various nations be set up under the United Nations. Clause 7 also stated that 
allocation of fissionable materials should be put in the hands of the UN.56 That it would 
be easier to make the United States a colony again, than to get the American negotiators 
to agree to those clauses never seemed to cross the British delegation’s mind. The United 
States simply would never agree to those conditions. The next three British drafts were 
similar but tended to have more watered down language. Clearly, this was the effect of 
American displeasure with the specific proposals the British had brought to the table.
The first American draft of an agreement was a different animal altogether than 
the British proposals. The agreement was filled with lofty language and no specific 
proposals. What action the agreement provided was connected to the draft Clause 5,
56 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex D, Nov 5, 1945
42
which weakly recommended setting up a commission to make a recommendation to the 
United Nations for atomic control. This was hardly an adventurous plan. On November 
14, the British and American delegations at last agreed on a final draft. The agreement 
looked definitively American. Clause 4 affirmed the both countries were willing to share 
basic scientific research. The very next clause admitted that the basic scientific 
knowledge of atomic energy was already available to almost anyone. In its treatment of 
the exchange of technical information, the agreement stated that giving away engineering 
and technical data would have a counter-productive effect the problem of the atomic 
bomb. “We are, however, prepared to share, on a reciprocal basis with others of the 
United Nations, detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of 
atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for 
destructive purposes can be devised.” What possible safeguards the agreement referred 
to were not revealed or explained. The result of all the discussion was an informal, non­
binding agreement with no real suggestions for dealing with the international control of 
nuclear energy.
The Heart of the Matter
While the full delegations had been hammering out the meaningless detail of the 
tripartite agreement, another group was at work. Truman and Attlee had agreed that
57 Foreign Office Records, [C.P. (45) 272], Annex M, Nov 5, 1945
43
Anderson and R.M. Makins would meet with the new Secretary of War, Judge Patterson, 
and Groves to concentrate on the atomic relations between the two nations. The main 
business was to provide a replacement to the Quebec Agreement. Vannevar Bush, before 
the conference, had recommended a plan to eliminate all political provisions from the 
Quebec Agreement in exchange for continued American control of the Combined Policy 
Committee. In this way, the United States could retain a monopoly on fissionable 
material. He proposed that the Combined Policy Committee should work out the 
dissemination of information later.58 The United States could keep materials coming in, 
and eliminate the clause, which required them to consult with the British before using the 
bomb. The British agreed to this, thus voiding the embarrassing provisions in the Quebec 
Agreement for both nations. Anderson remarked to Patterson that they were anxious to 
start building pilot plants and wanted to know where the matter of commercial rights 
stood. Anderson got right to the heart of the matter and asked for continuing scientific 
collaboration, including technical “know-how.” Patterson assured him that a solution 
would found that would not place the UK at a disadvantage. Instead of pressing him on 
that vague assurance, the British found the reply totally acceptable.59
However, the British wanted the United States to agree to something on paper 
about the continuation of scientific collaboration. The final agreement had seemingly 
very resolute and binding language: First that the Combined Policy Committee and 
Combined Policy Trust remain as they were. Thus Groves was assured of continued
58 Department o f States, Foreign Relations O f The United States (Washington DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1967), 1945, vol. II, pg. 70-74.
59 Ibid,, pg. 65-66.
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control of the uranium. The second part was a seeming concession to the British. The 
United States proposed a statement to the effect that there would be “ .. .full cooperation 
in the field of atomic energy...” The British demanded the insertion of the word 
“effective” into the provision. After some wrangling, the United States agreed. The 
agreement was known as the “Groves-Anderson Memorandum.” The resulting agreement 
sounded concrete, but actually was a masterpiece of ambiguity. At the beginning, it was 
decided that the agreement would be an informal one. A formal treaty would have 
constitutionally necessitated a vote from the Senate, which neither party was eager to 
have involved. In other words, even though both the President and the Prime Minister 
signed the agreement, it was not a legal binding document. It was nearly as enforceable 
as a gentleman’s handshake. Clement Attlee boarded a train for Ottawa the night of
tV>November 14 , confident that he had solved the problem of Anglo-American 
collaboration. That confidence was to be short lived. 60
60 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952 
(London, 1974) p. 85-86.
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O f Spies and Men
After the atomic bomb had been revealed to the American people, Congress 
immediately took an interest in it. Truman had pledged to the American people that he 
would submit a plan to Congress for the domestic control of energy. The question was 
who was to control the atomic bomb and nuclear energy? At the time, Leslie Groves and 
the military were in possession of it. In a meeting in late September o f 1945, Truman had 
suggested that the Manhattan Project’s military oversight be continued in peacetime.61 
The administration submitted a domestic atomic energy bill, the May-Johnson bill, which 
recommended the continued control of the nuclear energy program by the military. The 
Manhattan project scientists, who streamed down from their ivory towers to lobby against 
it, fiercely opposed this bill. Many scientists, who had worked on the bomb, were 
horrified after its actual use. They felt that continued military control over the atomic 
bomb could induce the United States into its further use. In reaction to this protest, 
Senator Brian MacMahon, the head of the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, opened 
hearings on a rival bill. This enabled scientists to air their fears at the possibility of the 
establishment of a “military state” through the bill. MacMahon submitted a rival bill 
providing civilian control of nuclear energy. To investigate the feasibility of the bill,
61 T. Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally, (New York: Crowell, 1954) p.288.
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McMahon’s committee delved into the secret of the development of the atomic bomb. 
The senator requested that Groves provide him with the details of the administration and 
making of the atomic bomb. Groves categorically refused, in order to protect the secret 
of the Combined Development Trust. His refusal won over many in Congress to support 
the opposing MacMahon bill. Public opinion stood with the MacMahon bill as well.
This dissolved over night with the disclosure of a Soviet spy ring working in Canada, in 
February 1946.62
The spies received an amount of high-grade uranium ore from British scientist 
Alan Nunn May. In reality, the spy case was actually relatively minor, and would be 
overshadowed several years later with the disclosure of Soviet spies working in the 
Manhattan project. But, by 1945 only the Alan Nunn May ring had been discovered, thus 
casting a shadow over British security measures.
The May case went public and quickly public opinion turned away from civilian control. 
Columnist Frank McNaughton broke the story citing a “confidential source” that told him 
the spies were targeting scientists in the United States. This “source,” it was learned 
years later, was none other then Major General Leslie Groves.
Meanwhile, Groves had every reason to provoke a public suspicion of scientific 
control of the bomb.64 The spy scare was used effectively by the congressional 
proponents of the May-Johnson act and military control. The spy scandal, provoked by 
Groves, subsequently initiated the transmutation of the MacMahon bill. To guard against
62 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 121-122.
63 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1995) p. 
165-179.
64 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 130-131.
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atomic spies, the bill was amended in Congress, to make providing any other nation with 
classified nuclear information a federal crime punishable by prison time.65 The 
transformed bill looked little like the original. Along with this spy clause, the military 
was given a seat on the new Atomic Energy Commission. Thus the atomic bomb was 
not put entirely into civilian hands as the original McMahon bill called for. The Atomic 
Energy Act, as it was called, was passed in the summer of 1946. Groves sacrificed total 
military control, but preserved the monopoly. The United States’ informal agreement 
with Great Britain on scientific exchange was never discussed. The window of scientific 
collaboration had seemingly closed.
The End of the Road
The British meanwhile, were quickly getting anxious about the ambiguity of the 
“Groves-Anderson memorandum.” As a test of the American willingness to exchange 
information, the British announced at the February 1946 Combined Policy Committee 
meeting that they intended to build a plant to produce plutonium in Britain. They
65 This penalty was later substantially increased to capital punishment. It was under this act, that Julius and 
Ethel Rosenburg were executed in 1953.
66 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon, p. 149.
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requested that Groves provide the details of some American facilities. Groves denied the 
request on the grounds that plants in Britain were insecure. The British angrily protested 
and at the April 1946 meeting of the Combined Policy Committee demanded a firm and 
real agreement on scientific exchange. What the American delegation gave them was in 
effect, a knockout blow to their hopes of getting the technical secrets of the bomb. 
Appropriately enough, Major General Leslie Groves orchestrated it. Groves pointed out 
that Clause 102 of the United Nations Charter, to which both countries had signed, 
required the registration of all treaties.68 Since both the United States and Great Britain 
had publicly declared their supposed support for international control of nuclear energy, it 
would be diplomatically impossible to register a bilateral agreement on the exchange of 
information. Attlee frantically telegraphed Truman reminding him that he had promised 
“full and effective collaboration.” Truman responded that the language “full and 
effective cooperation” was very general, and had not obligated the United States to aid 
the British nuclear program. The British were incredulous. And if this American 
maneuver was the knockout, the deathblow was the passage of the Atomic Energy Act. 
Cooperation between the United Sates and Great Britain was now both diplomatically 
embarrassing and legally impossible.69
The Atomic Energy Act of course did not affect the Combined Development 
Trust. Uranium ore was still being shipped to the United States from the British 
Commonwealth and dominions. Ore was Britain’s last trump card, and they had waited
67 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 98-99.
68 L. Groves, Now It Can Be Told, p. 405-408.
69 M. Gowing, Independence And Deterrence: Britain And Atomic Energy, 1945-1952, p. 101.
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far too long to throw it down. The Combined Development Trust had been arranged on a 
need basis. The need for uranium had always been America’s. The British, angered by 
what they considered a betrayal, demanded half of all the uranium delivered to the trust 
since the end of the war; Groves categorically refused. The British proposed a 
compromise that all further material acquired from the Belgium Congo would be split 
50:50 between the two countries; Groves opposed this as well. In the final act, British 
Ambassador Lord Halifax delivered a note to the United States, which stated that if the 
compromise were not accepted within five days, the British government would cease all 
shipments of ore to the United States. The compromise was finally accepted. The 
Combined Development Trust was thus kept intact and split between the two countries 
until the United States abandoned it in 195-1. The Atomic Energy Act ended scientific 
collaboration between the United States of America and the United Kingdom.
The End of the Beginning
The nuclear diplomacy of Jimmy Byrnes lasted for little more than a year. When in 
December 1945, the Allied foreign ministers met in Moscow to work out the problems of 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Byrnes and other Americans entered the summit with 
the faulty assumption that the Soviets would be intimidated by the atomic bomb. The
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time had come for a test of strength. Byrnes was more than ready to try his hand at 
atomic diplomacy. After a talk with him, Stimson said Byrnes’ “mind is full of problems 
with the coming meeting of foreign ministers and he looks to having the presence of the
• * • 70bomb m his pocket, so to speak, as a great weapon to get through the thing.” Things 
would not work out that way. Byrnes came to the conference, by all accounts, very sure 
of himself. Unfortunately for him, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov was to 
remain absolutely firm. Stalin was not about to give up his Eastern European buffer 
states.
Stimson still sustained his confidence in the bomb; this much was painfully clear 
to his colleagues at the conference. Unwittingly paraphrasing Stimson, Molotov asked 
Byrnes if he had “an atomic bomb in his side pocket” during a conference reception. 
Byrnes joked back to him that “if you don’t cut out all this stalling and let us get down to
71work, I’m going to pull an atomic bomb out of my hip pocket and let you have it.” The 
comment was meant as a joke, but the underlying message was clear. The problem was 
that this implied threat meant nothing. The value of the bomb as a bargaining counter lay 
in its understated presence at the negotiating table. Byrnes never articulated just how this
• 79understated threat would affect or sway the Soviets.
The reality was that in the final analysis, it did not matter. Molotov used the 
conference to call the United State’s implied bluff. He continued to stall on the matters 
of Eastern Europe, and eventually derailed the conference. It became painfully obvious
70 G. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy, (New York: Penguin, 1985) p. 273.
71 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) p. 
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that simply having the bomb could not sway or intimidate the Soviets. Some of the 
reasons were obvious. First, Stalin was willing to bet that the United States lacked the 
will or the ruthless nature to drop atomic bombs on its erstwhile ally over the freedom of 
Eastern Europe. This was the very thing that the threat of the atomic bomb had to rest 
on. Secondly, the Soviets knew that while powerful, the few bombs the United States 
had, could not compensate for the fact that the Soviets still had over 150 divisions of 
battle tested troops in Europe. Dropping a bomb on Moscow would not have changed 
the military reality in Europe. Finally, what Truman and Byrnes did not know was that 
the Soviets were well on their way to developing their first bomb.73 In short, the attempt 
of Byrnes to use the atomic bomb, as a diplomatic lever was ill conceived and poorly 
thought out.
The undertaking, however, was understandable. The atomic bomb seemed at first 
to be an almost magical weapon, and the country’s leaders treated it as such until they 
were brought back to reality. Byrnes alienated many in his own agency, by keeping them 
almost totally uninformed on the proceedings in Moscow. This was a purposeful 
attempt to exert his independent use of the atomic bomb in negotiations. He confided to 
one aide that “I might tell the President sometime what happened [in Moscow], but I’m 
never going to tell those little bastards in the State Department anything about it.”74 It is 
possible that Byrnes could have used the aid of the some of the “little bastards,” such as 
George Frost Kennan or Charles Bohlen. After the conference (mainly because Byrnes 
kept Truman almost as little informed as the State Department) the President lost
73 R. Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making O f The Hydrogen Bomb, p. 167-168.
74 G. Herken, The Winning Weapon (New York, 1981), p.47-48.
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confidence in his Secretary of State. Byrnes resigned within a year. For the rest of his 
presidency, Truman would not again use the bomb for such reckless diplomatic 
purposes.
For several years after the war, Groves became a celebrity. The press dubbed him 
the “atom general.” But after the McMahon act went into effect, the atomic project 
came under civilian jurisdiction. In 1947, Groves had to hand over power to the Atomic 
Energy Commission, headed by David Lilienthal. He took an advisory post, but retired
7 Sto the business world within a year. The atomic monopoly so much cherished by 
Leslie Groves, was destroyed in 1949 when, contrary to all his predictions, the Soviet 
Union exploded an atomic bomb. The atomic “Pax Americana” was gone for good.
Great Britain commenced its own atomic project in 1947. Almost all Anglo- 
American collaboration except the Combined Development Trust had broken down. 
During this time, the overall relationship between the two countries had reached a low 
point. For the next several years, forays into renewed collaboration were contemplated 
and discussed, but nothing really came of them. The result was the detonation of a 
“Hiroshima-style” atomic device in 1952. The importance of this achievement was 
overshadowed by the American detonation of the first megaton hydrogen bomb the same 
year. Britain’s scientists had done a great bulk of the theoretical work on atomic energy, 
and their fair share of technical work. The evidence suggests that it was foolhardy for 
Britain to think that they could become secret partners with the United States, while 
Clement Attlee was pontificating on the virtues of internationalism.
75 W. Lawren, The General And The Bomb, (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1988) p.264-266.
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53
Conclusions
Scientific collaboration between the United States and Great Britain, which had 
started in earnest in 1943, evaporated in 1946. Even though the United States was soon 
to establish strong ties to the countries of Western Europe through the Marshall Plan and 
NATO, scientific exchange would not occur again between the two countries for more 
than a decade. Not until the Sputnik crisis was the United States ready to entrust its 
nuclear technology to the British. Why were nuclear relations a source of contention 
after the war? The reasons why Britain and the United States could not scientifically 
collaborate in the post-war world lay rooted in the fact that both countries had radically 
different views of their future and their past. The simplest reason was that the United 
States insisted on maintaining a monopoly of the atomic bomb, even if it meant breaking 
its promises of post-war cooperation with Britain. The United States found itself as the 
sole holder of the most powerful and decisive weapon ever known to the world. It was 
seemingly the ultimate bargaining chip. Despite several high-ranking officials who 
believed the atomic secret should be under international control, the majority believed 
the United States should keep its possession unto itself. Harry Truman, Secretary of 
State Byrnes, and nearly the entire American public wanted to believe it could stay that
54
way for years. Leslie Groves told them what they wanted to hear and they bought it. 
There was no cognition from the public and little from the administration that Great 
Britain had made an important contribution to the bomb project. In the face of the 
monumental American effort, they were considerably overshadowed.
The British contributed to their own failure by naively trusting in ambiguous 
executive agreements, while failing to effectively use their uranium bargaining chips.
The precedents set by Churchill and Roosevelt, at Quebec and Hyde Park, led the British 
to feel that their partnership with the United States sat on far firmer footing than it 
actually did. What chances they did have were hurt considerably, when Clement Attlee 
came to office and brought with him an unresolvable intemationalist-bilateralist 
approach to the Washington Conference. There the British wasted time by declaring airy 
international principles when they might have been demanding concrete agreements on 
scientific exchange. While the passage of the Atomic Energy Act and Groves’ use of the 
Clause 102 of the UN Charter was the collaboration’s requiem, British hopes died, when 
Leslie Groves won Harry Truman over to his monopolist agenda. The British often 
persisted in believing, despite evidence to the contrary, that the United States would give 
them the bomb. As the ones who initiated atomic research in 1940 with the Maud 
committee, and as the only partner in the Manhattan project they believed that they 
earned it. They naively assumed that meaningless paper agreements would open the 
doors of cooperation. Britain, the historically ruthless practitioner of realpolitik, trusted 
the United States to do the honorable thing and share American engineering secrets. No 
matter how many Anglophiles inhabited the American policy-making bureaucracy, they 
were unwilling to subvert the interests of the United States for those of Great Britain.
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What Great Britain received was a lesson in hardboiled pragmatism. The United States 
believed their most valuable ally was the atomic bomb, not the British. By any 
definition imaginable, a “special relationship” was not at work in the sphere Anglo- 
American nuclear relations. Instead, Great Britain found itself out in the cold.
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PART II
THE PROBLEM OF ANGLO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
57
In Washington Lord Halifax 
Once whispered to Lord Keynes 
I t ’s true they have the money bags 
But we have the brains77
This arrogant limerick left behind at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference captures 
the attitude of many in Great Britain about the role they would play in the economics of 
the post-war world. The United States might have the economic might in the post-war 
world, but surely they still needed, and wanted, the financial acumen of Great Britain.
This optimistic attitude prevailed in many of Britain’s leading minds. In their view, Great 
Britain was not an ailing ally who was looking for charity. Their partners in war, the 
United States, would certainly find it in its best interest to pay back Britain for the many 
sacrifices, which it had made for the common cause. America would certainly do its 
utmost to help Britain salvage its exhausted economy, if not in gratitude, then in its own 
interest in keeping a wise experienced partner. As noted before, during the war, Harold 
Macmillan, later the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and like Churchill, bom of 
an American mother saw an analog of the Anglo-American relationship in classical times.
77 Richard Gardner “Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy In Current Perspective,” in The ‘Special Relationship ’ 
edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1986) p. 185.
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“We...are Greeks in this American empire.”78 Certainly Franklin Roosevelt had given 
several indications that the United States would repay Britain. At the end of the war, 
Great Britain was looking at a myriad of problems: staggering sterling debts, an 
unfavorable balance of payments and a severely damaged industrial base. In this 
predicament, Great Britain looked to its wartime partnership with the United States to 
bail it out. However in the two years immediately following the Second World War, it 
was clear that the United States was looking at Britain, not as a partner, but as a 
supplicant. How did the “special relationship” initially fail in the realm of postwar 
economics?
Much like in post-war nuclear relations, Great Britain relied far too heavily on 
vague wartime promises made by Franklin Roosevelt about the future policy of the 
United States. Britain overestimated its own importance to the United States in the post­
war world, while underestimating, and misunderstanding the goals of the American 
leadership and the public. Great Britain again tried to secure a firm bilateral partnership, 
while the United States was concerned with extracting economic concessions in order to 
build the liberal capitalist framework: its model of the post-war world. In the process of 
relentlessly pressing a prostrate Britain into dismantling the economic underpinnings of 
its empire, the United States revealed its lack of commitment to a true “special 
relationship” with Great Britain in economic affairs.
78 David Reynolds, “Roosevelt, Churchill And The Wartime Anglo-America Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards 
A New Synthesis” in The ‘Special Relationship ’ edited by Wm. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, p. 35.
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Prelude
For many leaders on both sides of the ocean, the interval between world wars was 
a formative time in their views on the world economy. Great Britain had emerged from 
the War to End All Wars a bloodied but triumphant power bent on vengeance. Britain 
expended a sixth of its national wealth in the First World War, and had become a debtor 
country. Britain, along with France, had demanded huge reparations from a defeated 
Germany in the hope that it would prevent another European war. In this, they were 
disappointed. Britain was arguably the most committed participant in the League of 
Nations, only to see it fall into impotence. In finances, Britain had relied on the concept 
of free trade to ensure future prosperity, only to slide into depression. Their reaction to 
this depression was to look to empire. Great Britain had instituted a quasi-mercantilist- 
trading bloc in 1932, with the Ottawa Agreements. These agreements set up the Imperial 
Preference System in which Britain heavily favored trade within the British 
Commonwealth by universally erecting high tariff walls to outside trade and controlling 
sterling convertibility. In this way, Britain was directly or indirectly able to control 40%
TQof the world trade by 1938. In doing so, Britain was able to maintain a tenuously 
favorable balance of payments. This balance of payments was brittle though. The price 
of total retained imports for Britain in 1939, was L858* million. Great Britain was only 
able to pay for these imports with Z,471 million in exports. The rest of the balance came
79 Edward Crapol, “Tightening The Screws: Anglo-American Relations And The Cold War, 1945-1946,” 
(unpublished paper, 1977)
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• * . . .  snmainly from income of foreign investments and shipping earnings. The Second World 
War hit these two forms of income hard.
The United States in 1918 was the world’s largest creditor. It then watched in 
chagrin, as the bulk of these debts were defaulted on in the course of war and 
depression.81 Out of the inter-war period came several influential Americans who 
believed that American prosperity and world peace could only be guaranteed by the 
multilateral controls for trade and finances. These controls would ensure truly free and 
vigorous trade, which in turn would ensure peace and prosperity. Foremost among these 
individuals was Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who believed that 
“unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic 
competition, with war.”82 Hull would set the tune that many American officials would 
follow in the post-war world.
80 Sir Richard William Barnes Clarke, “Toward A Balance Of Payments: Appendix A,” (memorandum in 
the Overseas Finance division o f the Treasury, May 11, 1945, found in Anglo-American Economic 
Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)
81 Only Finland was able to pay off its debts to the United States in the 30’s. The memory o f the massive 
defaulting o f payments made many Americans less than eager to lend money abroad.
82 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs O f Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948) p. 525.
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The Future Deferred
When Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt met at the Atlantic Conference 
in August of 1941, a mutual statement of views and values was not the main objective. 
The conference had been suggested by Roosevelt to consult on Lend-Lease, the details of 
which were being worked out in Washington. The Atlantic Charter was a somewhat 
unexpected byproduct of the conference. There was some pressure on Roosevelt, 
particularly from the State Department, to extract some significant concessions on post­
war free trade from the British. As could be easily surmised, Hull and the State 
Department were vigorously opposed to any resumption of imperial preferences and 
closed sterling bloc trade by Great Britain. Many saw the Atlantic Conference as a good 
time to press Britain on these issues. The United States had not yet entered the war, and 
Britain was still in shock after narrowly averting of a Nazi invasion during the Battle of 
Britain.
Churchill, for his part, initially did not wish to spend a great deal of time on post­
war planning. His main concern was getting America into the war. Roosevelt proposed 
over dinner that they should draft a declaration “laying down certain broad principles
SIAwhich should guide our policies along the same road.” Churchill met this with an
83 Richard Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins And Prospects O f Our International Order, 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969) p. 40.
84 Ibid., p. 43.
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ambiguous draft avoiding specific post-war commitments. This was unacceptable to the 
State Department, which responded with a draft that attacked the Imperial Preference 
System. In the State Department draft, both countries would “strive to promote mutually 
advantageous economic relations between them through the elimination of any 
discrimination in the United States or the United Kingdom against the importation of any 
product originating from the other country.” In response to this, the Prime Minister 
asserted that if this statement would be held to the Ottawa agreements, it would be his 
duty to submit it for approval to Parliament and the Governments of the Dominions.
This, he advised, would take at least a week.85 This ploy worked, and Roosevelt had the 
State Department back down. Roosevelt, even more than Churchill, was less than 
enamored with post-war planning and did not want to jeopardize the time frame of the 
conference. Churchill was allowed to insert the phrase “with due respect to existing 
obligations,” which would seem to exempt the Imperial Preference System. This
Of.
amended statement became the fourth clause of the charter. The clause itself was used
to differing effect in the two countries. In the United States, it was held out as a 
declaration of free trade to public opinion, while the British public could interpret it as 
respecting the Ottawa agreements.
At the same time the Lend-Lease talks in Washington, in the summer of 1941, 
also touched on the question of the post-war world. The talks began with the arrival in 
Washington, of John Maynard Keynes, the legendary British economist. The issue at 
question was Article VII in the Lend-Lease agreement. The State Department was
85 Ibid, p. 44-46.
86 Julia Johnsen, The Eight Points o f  Post-War World Reorganization, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 
1942) p. 66-67.
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determined to get Britain to agree to a concrete elimination of its closed trading sphere 
and inconvertible sterling. In pursuit of this, Hull included Article VII in the Lend-Lease 
draft, which pointedly bound the two countries to forswear discrimination against the 
other’s products. A provoked British contingent pointed out that Article VII would 
seemingly apply to the Imperial Preference System, but not American tariffs. The U.S. 
contingent used the time honored American argument, which was that the British 
preference system was discriminatory, while tariffs were not.
The issue was apparently finally settled after some informal negotiation between 
British Ambassador Lord Halifax and the State Department. What resulted was a rather 
slippery clause that committed the signatories “to the elimination of all forms of 
discriminatory treatment in international commerce and to the reduction of tariffs and 
other trade barriers.” This statement seemed to eliminate the imperial preference 
system. But the clause also asserted that the “elimination of discrimination would be
godetermined by agreed action... in the light of governing economic conditions.” What 
this action would be, or in what economic conditions, was frankly unclear. The British 
cabinet was skeptical enough to hold back on final agreement. This led Roosevelt to 
intervene and reassure Churchill. According to Churchill, Roosevelt gave him a definite 
assurance that “(the British) were no more committed to the abolition of imperial 
preference, than the American Government were committed to the abolition of their high
o n
protective tariffs.” In short, Roosevelt was telling Churchill that the clause was only
87 Crapol, p. 5.
88 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 59.
89 Ibid. p. 65.
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inserted for form’s sake and was not a binding post-war agreement. This is, in short, 
what Churchill told Parliament. Yet it was far from what the State Department or 
Congress believed.
Thus in both the Atlantic Charter and in Article VIE of the Lend-Lease agreement, 
imprecise language was used to avoid having to work out defined positions on post-war 
trade preferences. This imprecise language was interpreted differently by the public of 
each country. The confusion was, at the time, beneficial to the British. The United States 
had the money and the resources, and most likely could have pressed Britain into explicit 
concessions. That, however, was not the spirit Roosevelt wanted to engender. The 
confusion was supplemented by an apparent promise by Roosevelt to Churchill, to respect 
Britain’s pre-war status quo. Like the personal agreements Churchill would receive from 
Roosevelt later, the question not asked was if it would be binding to Roosevelt’s 
successors?
A View from the Basement
By the beginning of 1945, it was apparent that the Allies would be victorious.
The impending end of conflict gave American and British leaders an impetus to examine
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their economic situations. This period also gave the leaders an opportunity to avoid 
tackling in a meaningful way the difficult issues of the immediate post-war world.
When the British leaders crawled out of their figurative bomb shelters and took a 
look around, the sight that greeted their eyes was abhorrent. Britain had spent a quarter of 
its total wealth in fighting the war. Out of a 1939 figure of L30 billion, L7.3 billion had 
been lost. Of this amount, a good deal (LI .5 billion) was caused by the vast destruction 
inflicted by the Luftwaffe and V-weapons. Shipping losses caused another L .7 billion.
But even more harmful to Britain’s post-war prospects was disinvestment of L .9 billion in 
internal and L4.2 billion in external investments.90 Dividends and interest from these 
investments accounted for almost half of Britain’s pre-war receipts towards balance of 
payments. In 1945, it was estimated that Britain’s imports would be L I.25 billion and 
total overseas expenditures would be in the neighborhood of L2.9 billion. By contrast 
Britain’s exports would be a mere L.35 billion and total overseas income, L.8 billion.91 
Great Britain’s total yearly deficit would be a staggering L2.1 billion, or almost 10% o f  
their total wealth. At that rate the British economy would soon implode.
The British debt situation possibly looked worse. Great Britain had accumulated 
over $25 billion in debt to the United States from materials acquired through Lend- 
Lease. Grain, guns and garments sent to Britain during the war were dutifully counted 
and charged to Britain. Britain had also acquired a large debt to sterling bloc countries.
90 Ibid P- 178.
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The main reason for the sterling bloc debt was foolish wartime accounting. Great Britain 
had frozen the pound-sterling balances held in the City of London for the duration of the 
war. When buying supplies from a sterling bloc country* Britain would add to the frozen 
accounts instead of sending direct payment. The reason this was ill considered was that 
many of these debts were incurred fighting in defense of the very countries they were 
buying from. For example, the British added to the Egyptian account for local goods 
purchased to supply the British Army fighting the desert campaign against the Nazi 
advance on Egypt. Whether or not Egypt wanted the British there in the first place is 
irrelevant, these frozen balances ballooned to over L2.1 billion by 1945.93 To put it in 
full perspective, Great Britain owed her creditors almost one third o f the pre-war wealth 
of the entire British Empire. In addition to all these deficits and debts, Great Britain had 
to rebuild its bombed out cities and raise the standard of living for its people, who had 
been on strict rationing since 1939. It was estimated that Britain would have to eliminate 
or postpone its debts and raise its exports 50-75%, just to maintain its pre-war standard of 
living. And indeed, British leaders planned an unprecedented expansion of the social 
welfare net. The accounting did not add up.
America on the other hand had pulled itself out of the Great Depression and was 
surging ahead. Industrial production had shot up, as did the demand for consumer items 
and the exploitation of raw materials. In all, America was turning out an astounding 50% 
of the world’s goods and services. While the rest of the major markets in the world 
burned, the United States had become almost the only place to shop. This, however, was
93 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 168.
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somewhat paradoxical and self-defeating. If almost every other developed nation was 
destroyed, who was going to buy the new deluge of American products in this new 
world? Since the turn of the century, America had placed enormous emphasis on exports 
as a way of stabilizing the economy and on promoting liberal Open Door policies in other 
countries to facilitate exports. Without these exports there was no guarantee that 
Americans would live 50% better. The prospect of another post-war depression 
frightened many observers. Amid these prospects, one would think that the emphasis 
would have been placed on the immediate future. Remarkably, the United States instead 
devoted great energies to the construction of a long-term post-war framework for trade 
and financing
Trying to Hijack A New World
The Bretton Woods agreements evolved in great part out of American memories 
of 1919. At that time the United States had refused to play a role in the development of a 
post-war world, instead relying on a good deal of laissez-faire trade. Men like Cordell 
Hull were determined to not make that mistake a second time. The Bretton Woods talks 
were held to form a heretofore-unprecedented collective financial security arrangement. 
What was needed was a way to prevent the financial problem of a single nation or several
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nations from setting off an international crisis. The Bretton Woods negotiations were a 
largely Anglo-American affair. That is not to say that the British and the Americans had 
a unified vision of what the conference would or should bring about. Keynes negotiated 
for the British side. His conception of the post-war framework was that of a huge 
clearinghouse. He envisioned the clearinghouse with $26 billion in assets where 
countries could overdraw predetermined limits of money. That money could be used to 
stabilize currency, level balances of payments, and expand their economies through 
internal investment. Negotiating for the American side was the somewhat crude, yet 
tenacious Department of Treasury deputy, Harry Dexter White. His plan called for a 
smaller $5 billion stabilization fund that would mainly work to protect exchange rates. 
Keynes’ proposal was unacceptable to America because there would be no evident quotas 
on contributions. Thus if the demand for dollars was great (which it was sure to be) 
America would find itself forced to contribute the bulk of the fund.94 What the United 
States would have been doing then would have been tantamount to a $26 billion grant-in- 
aid to the world. The American delegation knew that this somewhat forced forerunner of 
the Marshall Plan would be completely unacceptable to the public.
The compromise was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a $8.8 billion fund 
in which the United States would contribute a maximum of $3.2 billion.95 Both sides 
misinterpreted the character of the fund, to conform to their post-war visions. The British 
government seemed to believe that its entire IMF lending quota would be made
94David Felix, Keynes: A Critical Life, (London: Greenwood Press, 1999) p. 273-278; Gardner, Sterling- 
Dollar Diplomacy, p. 71-77.
95 David Reynolds and David Dimbleby, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain And America 
In The Twentieth Century (New York: Random House, 1988) p. 179.
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immediately available for withdrawal. In presenting a statement to the House of Lords, 
Keynes seemed to believe that L325 million of IMF money could be added to the British 
dollar and gold reserves, and that the quotas to the rest of the sterling area could be added 
to this.96 Keynes used that interpretation to elicit the approval of the House of Lords. 
America believed the exact opposite. Dean Acheson assured the Senate “There is no idea 
whatever that a person walks in and goes through the empty formality of saying ‘I need
07this presently to make a payment’... that would be childishly absurd.” Britain believed 
that it had a source of post-war income. America would not let Britain turn a multilateral 
framework into a hidden bilateral payment. Much like the Atlantic Charter and Article 
VII o f the Lend-Lease negotiations, the Bretton Woods agreements led to confusion over 
critical points of the agreement.
“Equality of Sacrifice”
How was Great Britain to cope with its shattered economy in the post-war period? 
In wrestling with this problem, Great Britain began to fall into the trap of believing that
96 The parliamentary debates (Hansard). House o f Lords official report.
(London : H.M.S.O., 1944) 840 (May 23, 1944)
97 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 135.
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Roosevelt’s breezy promises and friendly demeanor with Churchill reflected the thinking 
of the American establishment and public. Britain tried to project a close bilateral 
wartime relationship into the post war world.
To Great Britain, Lend-Lease was a godsend. Munitions and provisions flooded 
Britain. It is fair to say that the British government accepted Lend-Lease for what it was: 
a wartime arrangement. However, by mid-war, the British leadership began to have new 
conceptions of what Lend-Lease was. In design, Lend-Lease was supposed to cover two 
stages. Stage I encompassed the general war against Germany and Japan and was well 
underway. Stage II was to be the period in which Germany had been defeated, but Japan 
was still fighting. It was unclear what Britain’s exact role was to be in the Pacific 
campaign, or how Lend-Lease would be affected. The phase after the defeat of Japan,
A O
presumably Stage III seemed to be a mystery to all. The American role in a post-war 
world was ambiguous at best. In the absence of any concrete post-war rebuilding plans, 
Britain began to look longingly at Lend-Lease as its lifeline.
Subsequently, a new doctrine began to be preached in Britain, the doctrine of 
“equality of sacrifice”. In the view of many an Englishman, it was the United Kingdom 
that had saved the United States and not the other way around. In the British view, Hitler 
had been an equal threat to both the United States and Great Britain. Britain maintained 
that the United States in effect, had been defended by Britain, from Nazi Germany, from 
1939-1941 gratis. During that time frame, Britain had exhausted nearly $4 billion of cash 
and gold reserves. Most of this had gone directly to the United States through the Cash 
and Carry arrangement preceding Lend-Lease. Even after America had entered the war,
98 Ibid. p. 54-56.
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Britain continued to bear the bulk of the burden. In 1942 and 1943, the number of British 
divisions encountering the enemy was 50% higher than the American divisions." It was 
not until 1944, that parity was reached. The fact that by the end of the war America was 
doing the vast bulk of the fighting did not erase the fact that proportionally Britain had 
done above her share. Britain had even participated in sending raw materials to the 
United States through Reverse Lend-Lease. In the view of many in Britain, the United 
States had profited from Britain’s awful sacrifices. In the mind of the average Briton, the 
burden of post-war construction was on the United States.100 There was thus an 
expectation by many within the British public and government, that the United States 
would continue Lend-Lease after the war. The hope was that the U.S. would at the very 
least let Britain do some funded rebuilding during Phase II. Roosevelt stoked British 
expectations, when in his report to Congress on Lend-Lease, he stated “No nation would 
grow rich through the war effort of its allies. The money costs of war will fall according 
to the rule of equality of sacrifice.”101
Exactly what Phase II would be, changed throughout the war. The problem was 
that no one really had a good idea of when Japan would be defeated, or how much of a 
role Britain would have to play. The expectation was that it would take anywhere from 
18 months to two years to defeat Japan, after Germany fell.
Churchill was eager to get answers from Roosevelt on these issues, and eager to 
press Britain’s claim. He received his chance during the second Quebec conference in
99 Anglo-American Economic Collaboration edited by Sir Alec Caimcross, p. 24.
100 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 173-176.
101 Ibid p. 167.
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September of 1944. Churchill was at his diplomatic best in facing Roosevelt on these 
issues. To demonstrate Britain’s willingness to “earn its keep,” Churchill dutifully 
volunteered the use of British air and naval forces in the fight against Japan, hitherto an 
exclusively American naval fight. Churchill calculated that, if Britain expected to stay in 
the American public’s good graces, the American public needed to see the Pacific as an 
Allied fight, not just an American one. Britain’s effort in Burma had come under attack 
by many in the American military as just a defensive maneuver to protect Britain’s India 
colony. Some Americans asserted that the acronym for the Southeast Asia Command, 
SEAC, actually stood for “Save England’s Asian Colonies.”102 To the chagrin of 
Roosevelt’s senior naval advisor FDR accepted Churchill’s offer.103
Having demonstrated a willingness to fight Japan, Churchill moved on to Phase II. 
Churchill informed Roosevelt that he hoped that during the war with Japan, Britain would 
continue to receive food, shipping, and the like, to continue to cover its needs; Roosevelt 
assented. Churchill suggested to the President, that he hoped Lend-Lease would be 
continued on a proportional basis for munitions, while non-munitions aid would be 
maintained at the present level in order for Britain to begin to rebuild. Churchill also 
hoped that the President would assent, even if it meant that British manpower would be 
used for civilian purposes. Roosevelt agreed to this, but surprisingly he and his aides 
thought it better to put a monetary figure on it, rather than some formula. He thought that
102 Walter LaFeber, “Roosevelt, Churchill And Indochina, 1942-1945,” American Historical Review  
(December 1975) p. 1282.
103 Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain And America, 1944-1947, (New York: Columbia 
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wanted to avoid the political, military and colonial complications that would result from a large British 
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$3.5 billion in munitions assistance and $3 billion in non-munitions assistance would be 
sufficient for Phase II. Roosevelt also agreed to remove restrictions on the British export 
trade.104 This seemed to be a firm agreement on Lend-Lease aid from the American 
government, at least in Phase II. The monetary commitment by Roosevelt could easily 
have been interpreted as money in the bank, regardless of how long or short Phase II 
would be. Would this apparent endorsement o f continued Lend-Lease funding mean that 
America was ready to use the bilateral Lend-Lease agreement to help rebuild Britain? 
This was far from the case.
America as a whole had a far different view of “equality of sacrifice” than Great 
Britain. In many quarters, the view was that America would have eventually triumphed 
with or without Great Britain. After the 1942 congressional elections, the Congress took 
on a more conservative frame of mind. Many Republicans and Southern Democrats had 
seen Lend-Lease as a big “give-away.” Few Americans were aware that reverse Lend- 
Lease even existed and most thought that Lend-Lease should only be used for the 
immediate prosecution of the war. 83% of the public in one poll believed that Great 
Britain should begin immediate repayment of Lend-Lease as soon as the war was 
completed.105 Most Americans still saw Britain, as they had always perceived it: a 
wealthy imperial colossus controlling a quarter of the world’s population.
Many of Roosevelt’s underlings were equally skeptical of the wisdom of using 
Lend-Lease to rebuild Britain. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff had unanimously held 
that Lend-Lease should only be used for immediate prosecution of the war. Cordell Hull
104 The Quebec Conference, 1944, Foreign Relations O f the United States, p. 344-346.
105 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, notes onpg. 173.
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was furious because Roosevelt had “attached no conditions to it whatever. These were 
numerous questions pending between us and Great Britain... the credits would be needed 
in our bargaining position with her.”106 Even Henry Stimson objected to a commitment 
of Lend-Lease money for British reconstruction. He did not object to aiding Britain in the 
post-war world, and in fact advocated that very issue. However, Stimson believed that “if 
we were going to make use of Lend-Lease appropriations in the post-war period when 
there was no longer any connection between them and the actual fighting of the recipient,
1 07we ought to consult Congress.” Roosevelt did not, in fact, have the authority to make 
monetary commitments to Britain. It was up to Congress to appropriate the funds. Yet 
the memorandum with the Phase II monetary commitments bore the mark “OK FDR.”
Roosevelt’s promises had again concealed a general apathy both in the public and 
the administration for the funding of Britain’s reconstruction. Churchill, however, was to 
walk away from the second Quebec conference believing that Britain had a firm 
commitment of funds.
106 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs O f Cordell Hull, (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948) p. 1618.
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“Which is the justice, which is the thief?”- King Lear
Despite expectations, Phase II lasted for all of three months. The atomic bomb 
ended the prospect of a bloody, protracted invasion of mainland Japan, and with it, the 
need for more British troops in the Pacific. In the mean time the unexpected happened: 
Roosevelt died and Churchill’s Conservative party was defeated in general elections. All 
at once Harry Truman and Clement Attlee headed their respected governments. Much 
like in nuclear relations, Attlee and the British were to find that Roosevelt’s wartime 
promises did not necessarily bind Truman to follow them. Britain would need new 
options for post-war construction.
The first pledge to go was Phase II aid. It was not known if Truman was even 
aware of Roosevelt’s promise of $6.5 billion to Britain in Lend-Lease. Whatever his 
previous knowledge, Truman felt seemingly little compunction about abruptly canceling 
Lend-Lease, which he in fact did. On August 21, it was announced that no new orders for
Lend-Lease would be taken and those in the pipeline were to be returned to the United
1 08States. This news hit London like a weight; the government and press reacted 
accordingly. Hugh Dalton, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, wrote, “This very heavy 
blow was struck at us without warning, and without discussion. We had expected at least
108 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership p. 61.
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some tapering off of Lend-Lease over the first few years of peace.”109 Many in the press 
believed that this was a sign of official disapproval of the new Labour government, which 
had won on a platform of socialist programs. It was widely asserted that Roosevelt would 
not have handed Britain such an affront. Churchill, now opposition leader, spoke out 
against it in Parliament. The reaction from American papers, having no knowledge of 
Roosevelt’s promises was incredulity. One paper characterized the British reaction as 
“being mad at your rich uncle, who has been giving you hand-outs, because he died.” 110 
One letter to Truman read “Let me congratulate you on putting England in her place.
Give them the old Yankee hard-driven-bargain treatment and you shall earn the affection 
and support of the American people.”111
While Attlee professed that the news was “a bolt from the clear sky,” the Labour 
Government should have been reasonably aware. After Roosevelt’s death, ranking 
officials in the American government had been sending signals that aid would be 
terminated. Keynes had warned that Lend-Lease “will cease almost immediately” upon 
the defeat of Japan. In any case, the British would have look to some other means to 
rebuild. The man who was entrusted with planning a new approach was possibly the 
most brilliant British economist since David Ricardo.
John Maynard Keynes, 1st Baron of Tilton, had already been proved prophetic 
when he correctly predicted that the staggering reparations levied against Germany after 
the First World War, would drive that country into economic nationalism and militarism
109 Hugh Dalton, Memoirs: Vol. 3, High Tide And After, 1945-1960, (London: Muller 1953) p.68.
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in his The Economic Consequences o f  the Peace. His espousing of deficit spending in 
The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and Money gave rise to the concept of
• 1 1 9Keynesian economics. Keynes was an economic genius who had devoted many of his 
years to selfless government service. He was also a pompous, elitist snob; the very 
picture of British arrogance, which many Americans still believed in and detested.
The brilliant Cambridge economist and former member of the famed Bloomsbury 
literary coterie, which included Virginia Woolf, was to be relied upon to perform one 
more act of public service for his country. The end of Lend-Lease in light of Britain’s 
mounting debts and poor balance of trade presented the threat, in Keynes’ words, of a 
“Financial Dunkirk.”113 In March, Keynes had produced “Overseas Financial Policy in 
Stage III” in which he gave three choices for dealing with post-war economic troubles.
Sir Richard Clarke, who was present at the meeting paraphrased Keynes’ choices as 
“Austerity,” “Temptation,” and “Justice.”114 “Austerity” would entail complete financial 
independence of the United States. To achieve this Britain would have to institute more 
stringent rationing and government controls for three to five years, establish strict 
national planning on both imports and exports, and severely limit colonial and overseas 
expenditure and activity. “Temptation” was a course for accepting large amounts of 
American loans in exchange for accepting all U.S. demands on Britain (i.e. elimination of 
imperial preferences, free sterling convertibility, etc.) The third choice was “Justice.” 
“Justice” would, in effect, put a call on Roosevelt’s promise that “The money costs will
112 David Felix, Keynes: A Critical Life, (London: Greenwood Press, 1999)
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fall according to the role o f equality of sacrifice.” Great Britain would demand $3 billion 
on a retroactive Lend-Lease from 1939-1941, plus an option on an additional $5 billion 
loan at no to low interest. A certain amount would also be requested from Canada and 
the Commonwealth. In exchange for this, Britain would make a certain amount of 
sterling (around L I 50 million) liquid and convertible. Keynes favored “Justice”, although 
he also favored keeping “Austerity” alive as a backup. “Temptation” would seem to have 
been the least favored option. Keynes noted that any of these options would also have to 
be supplemented by an increase in exports and the subsidization of post-war occupation 
duties.115
If there was any question Keynes doubted that America would come through, he 
rested them in “The Present Overseas Financial Position of the United Kingdom.” In it 
he stated, “...in relation to the vast expenditures of the war the sums involved are a trifle. 
In fact it is inconceivable that the people of the United States can be influenced in their 
decision, one way or another, by the sum of the money at stake. It cannot be the money 
that matters.”116 This was an astoundingly naive statement for someone of Keynes’ 
stature and experience to make. As optimistic as “Justice” was, Keynes would apparently 
become even more Pollyannaish. After the cut-off of Lend-Lease, the British Cabinet 
tapped Keynes to lead a delegation to Washington.
115 Ibid.. p. 53-55.
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All we have done for you, and this is how you repay us!
Keynes and the British team were to find out that his version of Justice was 
contradicted by the American sense of it. Again, much as like in nuclear relations, Britain 
would find out how non-binding Franklin Roosevelt’s promises would be to the Truman 
administration.
If he was optimistic in March, Keynes was even more so preparing to embark to 
Washington. The Washington talks were scheduled to open on September 11. Keynes 
assured the ministers that he could persuade the Americans to offer a $6 billion grant-in- 
aid. Keynes did not even touch on any strings that would be attached to this free gift.
This certainly was what the Labour Government wanted to hear.117 Keynes even asserted 
that he should not be authorized to agree on anything but a grant.118 This optimistic view 
was to haunt Keynes. The new Secretary of Treasury Fred Vinson led the American 
delegation. Vinson’s deputy was Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Will 
Clayton, who was a friend of Keynes, and generally a friend of Britain. Friendship, 
however, would play little part in the negotiations. Vinson was a conservative, homespun 
Democrat who did not particularly warm to Keynes’ acerbic and cerebral wit. Keynes 
opened the negotiations with a rousing speech bemoaning Britain’s post-war plight, and
117 Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership p. 188-189; Anglo-American Economic Collaboration edited by Sir 
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the basic tenets of his “Justice” argument. Keynes was soon unceremoniously stripped of 
his expectations.
Roosevelt’s vague promises of “equality of sacrifice” had no relevance to the 
situation. The American delegation was looking into the future for several reasons. 
Without the Roosevelt modus operandi of putting off a tough issue for a later time, the 
American delegation was free to use the loan as a hammer for free trade. In addition, the 
British delegation could not be coming as supplicants at a worse time. Without, as yet, 
the perceptible threat of a menacing Soviet Union, the opinion of the American public 
and Congress was that domestic issues were far more important than international 
problems. Intent on welcoming home the GI’s and “normalcy,” only 7% of Americans 
believed that foreign problems were vital.119 There also was the opinion expressed by ex- 
President Herbert Hoover: if  the United States gives Britain free billions, America would 
have to do likewise for Russia, China, France, etc. There was in fact also the widespread 
popular opinion that the Socialist Labour Government would spend the money on 
nationalizing industries and instituting expensive social programs.120 The Labour foreign 
policy slogan of “left knows left” also could not have sat well with a great number of
1 'y i  • •Americans. If “Equality of Sacrifice” meant anything to the public, it meant the Britain
should be more grateful for America’s Herculean wartime effort. Certainly, Congress as 
a whole reflected these views, and Vinson and Clayton knew it. There would be no grant.
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trusted Churchill and the Conservatives more as a known quantity.
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Roosevelt’s promise was just that: Roosevelt’s. He was gone, as was “Equality of 
Sacrifice.”
Once stripped of his optimism, Keynes started working for an interest-free loan. 
However, he had so thoroughly convinced the Cabinet and Attlee that he could obtain a 
grant, that they were initially unwilling to accept a loan. Belatedly Keynes sent London 
his opinion on September 26, 1945, that “arguments based on our previous sacrifices 
would do no good...”122 This set the tone for what could only be described as grueling 
negotiations. The American delegation was firmly grounded in the reality of the situation. 
Congress would not approve a grant and Congress would not approve an interest-free 
loan. Thus there was no point in even negotiating on these grounds. Keynes’ urbane wit, 
as noted, had little effect on Vinson. And Clayton, though sympathetic to the British 
cause, was more interested in improving America’s commercial position. In short, the 
bureaucracy, though more sympathetic than the general public, still put America’s 
interests squarely before Britain’s.
In the process of negotiating what turned out to be a $3.75 billion dollar loan with 
2% interest over 50 years, the British had to make several concessions. The British were 
obligated to make sterling convertible within a year after the loan was ratified. Making 
sterling convertible to dollars would enable sterling bloc countries to more readily buy in 
American markets. The accumulated sterling bloc balances proved a little tricky. The 
United States wanted the balance released and convertible into dollars so it could be used 
to buy American products. However, they realized that in doing so Britain would just be 
giving back the dollars secured in the loan. America sought and got an agreement to
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write off the balances. The opening of the sterling area also mortally wounded the 
Imperial Preference System. In future years, it would become untenable. Roosevelt’s
1 9 Tassurance that the United States would not threaten Imperial Preference rang hollow.
The British were also committed to ratifying the Bretton Woods Agreements. In 
return for this, the United States wiped out the British Lend-Lease debt with the exception 
of $650 million of Lend-lease goods in the pipeline. This was probably far below the 
goods’ market value.124 All in all, this was a generous settlement. In effect, the British 
received a 97% discount on all American goods provided during the war. It was, 
however, far closer to “Temptation” than “Justice.” The quick and fuzzy promises that 
had often soothed British egos during the war were replaced by cold, hard reality. Just as 
in nuclear relations, America was more interested in using multilateral frameworks, like 
the Bretton Woods agreements, to enhance the Hegemonie des Etats-Unis, rather than 
bilateral agreements with Britain. And, any bilateral agreements America did agree to 
were to be in the long-term interests of American hegemony.
122 Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision o f  Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance And The Emerging Cold 
War, 1943-1946, (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1987) p. 58.
123 The Collected Writings O f John Maynard Keynes, (Cambridge, Cambridge, 1979) p. 627.
124 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, pg. 208.
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An Era of Bad Feelings
The last step in the loan process, and possibly the most acrimonious, was the 
debate that raged over ratification of the loan in London and Washington. This debate 
exposed the distrust and bad feelings expressed by the public of both countries.
While Labour controlled the House of Commons, the House of Lords was 
controlled by Conservatives, and under the Parliament Act of 1911, could hold up a bill 
for two years. John Allse Brooke Simon, First Viscount Simon exclaimed that “I do not 
suppose there has ever been a very important international agreement put before 
parliament for acceptance in which it was found that conditions aroused in this country 
such deep anxiety and widespread distrust.” In the House of Commons, Churchill 
declared himself astonished that the United States would charge interest on the loan. The 
usually pro-American Economist asserted “It is aggravating to find that our reward for 
losing one-quarter of our national wealth in the common cause is to pay tribute for half a 
century to those who have been enriched by the war.” A Conservative MP declared that 
the agreement was “an economic Munich.” A Labour MP thought the agreement 
“niggardly, barbaric and antediluvian.”125 It took a rousing defense in the House of Lords
125 Reynolds and Dimbleby: An Ocean Apart, p. 180.
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by Keynes to get loan through, and the cracking of the Labour party whip on its 
backbench members, to ratify i t .126
On the American side, the loan ran into Anglophobia and isolationist sentiment. 
Returning America GI’s had to pay more than 2% interest on home loans. There were 
questions as to why the British got better treatment?127 “The British loan is not to 
provide relief for starving people. It is to provide relief for a decadent empire. My slogan 
is ‘Billions for the relief of starving children but not one cent of American taxpayers’ 
money for the relief of Empires’” exclaimed Colorado Democratic Senator Edwin 
Johnson paraphrasing Charles Pinckney. The United Kingdom had “about $8 billion in 
dollar assets lying around in other countries, several billions in dollars in cash now. She 
has about $15 billion in gold mines, about $8 billion (of) assets in diamond mines. She is 
far from being strapped.” according to Democratic Representative William Barry of New 
York. 50% of Americans in one poll expressed disapproval of the loan against 37% who
1 9 8  • • •  ■approved. In short, the public was skeptical o f giving a helping hand to their “partner.” 
The loan finally was passed in July, 1946 after months of acrimonious debate. The rift 
between America and Britain, however, was made painfully clear.
126 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 226-236.
127 Reynolds and Dimbleby: An Ocean Apart, p. 178.
128 Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, p. 236-240.
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Conclusions
Great Britain thought of itself as a partner with the United States during World 
War II and believed this partnership was destined to run into the postwar years. 
Roosevelt’s assurances of postwar respect for the British status quo and promises of post­
war financial aid had led them to believe that the United States respected their economic 
and security concerns. In the Atlantic Charter, in the Lend -Lease Agreement, and in the 
Second Quebec Conference, America seemed to promise Britain the extending of 
wartime partnership and privileges to the post-war world. However, Britain soon found 
out that in the first years of the Cold War, America was more interested in constructing a 
new global economic sphere of influence, in which it could be a hegemon, than in 
providing its wartime ally with bilateral aid. Much as in nuclear relations, the United 
States brushed conceptions of past sacrifices and contributions aside. When a loan was 
forthcoming, it was at the expense of the British commercial status quo. The British 
contributed to the chilly atmosphere, by taking what in effect had been wartime free 
money for granted. Keynes’ certainty that the United States would shower Britain with 
post-war money hurt the British in the negotiating room, and in public opinion. The 
bitter debate over the loan also proved that there was little sympathy in either country’s 
public consciousness, for the other. Thus in the first post-war years, the economic 
relationship between the United States and Great Britain was less than “Special.”
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CONCLUSION
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There is nothing so irrelevant as a poor relation. 
Harold W ilson'29
Winston Churchill allegedly, and nakedly, had declared that he, and by 
implication Great Britain, had nothing to hide from the President of the United States. 
While candidly revealing the extent o f Churchill’s trust in the United States, there has 
been a missing ingredient to this anecdote. Was this feeling of conviviality reciprocated 
by the United States towards Churchill, and by extension, Great Britain?
The term “Special Relationship” had been applied to other countries by 
academics; Israel, Brazil, West Germany and pre-communist China have all been alleged
1 TOto have a “special” relationship with the United States. What is most telling about this 
observation, is that in each of these relationships, the United States was by far the 
dominant partner imposing its will on the dependent countries. The United States and 
Great Britain had had a complex and compelling relationship for over two centuries. At 
the end of the war though, Great Britain was unarguably a “poor relation.” While the
129 David Reynolds, “A ‘special relationship’?: America, Britain and the international order since the 
Second World War,” International Affairs, vol. 62 (Winter 1985/1986), p.4.
130 Ibid, p.4; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978); 
John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., Latin America, The United States And The Inter-American System 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980); Hans w. Gatzke, Germany And The United States: A Special 
Relationship? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980); Michael H. Hunt, The Making O f A 
Special Relationship: The United States And China To 1914, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983)
Second World War had in many regards brought Anglo-American relations closer than 
they had been since colonial times, paradoxically, Great Britain and the United States had 
never been farther apart. By the end of the war, the United States was the most powerful 
state the world had ever witnessed. Great Britain, by contrast, was slipping into 
irrelevancy, while its empire and economy were disintegrating. As time progressed, 
Britain more and more resembled the poor relation relying on handouts from its rich 
cousin.
The two most important areas of Anglo-American post-war planning were in the 
realms of nuclear planning and economics. The atomic bomb was the only weapon 
seemingly capable of leveling the playing field with the Red Army. Most British leaders 
realized that if the United States abandoned Great Britain to its fate in the post-war world, 
the atomic bomb would be Britain’s only insurance against Soviet expansion.
Meanwhile, the United States was contemplating an atomic Pax Americana, with its 
monopoly of the atomic bomb. In the post-war world, Britain faced huge trade deficits, 
crippling debts and a destroyed infrastructure. Britain needed generous and liberal 
financial aid terms from the United States, while salvaging its anachronistic prewar 
trading bloc, if it was immediately to get back on its feet. The United States, for the sake 
of its new world capitalist order, was ready to tear down the very trading bloc that Britain 
was counting on, and use aid to its ostensible ally as a sledgehammer to do just that.
As the two most important issues in the Anglo-American relationship, the quality 
and quantity of nuclear and economic relations were the determining factors as to whether 
the “special relationship” actually existed in the immediate post-war world. During the 
war, there was an extraordinary level of cooperation and exchange. A lack of “trust,
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mutual consideration and the ability to treat the other’s requests sympathetically” in these 
two realms of Anglo-American interaction after the war, should indicate that a “special 
relationship” did not exist in that time period. Franklin Roosevelt and Winston 
Churchill’s relationship personified the wartime Anglo-American relationship. Both 
leaders had facilitated the unprecedented wartime exchange of military, economic and 
scientific material. This built a foundation of sand for the post-war Anglo-American 
relationship. With executive agreements, such as the Quebec Agreement and the Hyde 
Park Aide-Memoire, or with oral agreements such as Roosevelt’s reassurances about the 
Atlantic Charter’s free trade provision or his promise of Phase II Lend-Lease aid, the 
leaders constructed a false future of cooperation. This foundation of sand crumbled when 
the two leaders passed from the scene.
Influential American policy makers such as Leslie Groves, Jimmy Byrnes, Cordell 
Hull and Fred Vinson had their own agendas on the future role of America. All of these 
men intended to shore up the nascent American hegemonic project. Whatever 
Anglophilia they might have held was checked when American interests came into play. 
Whether it was the quest for a liberal capitalist framework, or an atomic monopoly, 
Britain figured in only so far as it could aid the United States. When their interests 
contradicted the United States’, British interests were the ones subverted. On Britain’s 
part, reminders of wartime effort fell upon deaf ears. Neither was Britain able to play the 
part of Greece to the Rome of the United States, contrary to what Harold Macmillan and a 
number of other British policy makers thought. These misconceptions were aggravated 
by other British missteps. Whether it was Clement Attlee’s inability to see that he could 
not follow both his desire for international control of the atomic bomb, and Britain’s need
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to form a postwar atomic partnership with the United States, or John Maynard Keynes 
overconfidence in forecasting a postwar grant in aid. These contradicting goals and 
missteps led to bruised feelings and antipathy on both sides.
Historian Bruce Russett saw a special relationship as originating in the wartime 
identity of interests. These mutual interests allegedly created a “We-feeling.” A true 
“special relationship” would enable “trust, mutual consideration and the ability to treat 
the other’s requests sympathetically.”131 Trust and mutual consideration may have been 
the basis for which Roosevelt and Churchill more often than not dealt with each other. 
However, this papered over and put off the acrimony that was the result of any 
collaboration. In the aftermath of the Second World War, this identity of interests no 
longer existed for the United States and Great Britain in either the nuclear or economic 
sphere. There was no “We feeling.” So, in point of fact, by that definition, there was no 
“Special Relationship.”
Many authors use the term “Special Relationship” as a handy catch phrase to sum 
up either the close common heritages and cultures of Great Britain and the United States, 
or as the sum of political Anglo-American relations, but they miss the point as to why 
Winston Churchill coined the phrase in the first place. The context of Churchill’s usage 
of the term “special relationship” in his Fulton, Missouri speech was important.
Churchill was not toasting a successful and intimate partnership. Rather, he was offering 
a desperate plea for the United States not to abandon Europe and Great Britain. To do 
this he invoked the specter of an “iron curtain” descending over Europe. These were not
131 Bruce Russett, Community And Contention: Britain And America In The Twentieth Century, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963) p. 27.
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the words of a partner; these were the desperate words of a supplicant. Thus, from that 
1946-vantage point, Churchill himself could see that the relationship was not yet special. 
In fact, in the political vacuum of the postwar world, the relationship was growing further 
apart. It would take a cold war to bring it back together.
The transition from hostile feelings to close partners, during the Second World 
War, was more illusion than reality. With the relative and absolute strengths of both 
countries changing so rapidly, neither the leaders nor public of either country were able 
to establish a permanent modus vivendi. Both countries needed longer to digest the 
rapid pace of events to create a true “special relationship.” As it was, due to American 
avarice and British blunders, in both nuclear and economic relations, the immediate 
post-war Anglo-American relationship was a frosty one of secrecy and dependency.
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